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Once More unto the Breach:
The Inherent Liberalism of the Criminal





Jean-Claude, a practitioner of voodoo who fled to the United
States from Haiti to escape the oppression of the Duvalier regime,
passes a man on the street who he recognizes as a former member of
the Tonton Macoutes, Duvalier's secret police. Consumed with
hatred and the desire for revenge, he goes home, fashions a doll in his
enemy's image, and drives a needle through its heart. He does so
with the intention of producing his enemy's death, which he firmly
believes will result from his action. His wife, another believer in
voodoo, is horrified by his action and turns him in to the police, who
arrest him for attempted murder. Jean-Claude is tried and convicted.
Laura and Frank are rabid anti-environmentalists who believe
there should be no restrictions on people's ability to utilize natural
resources. Intending to engage in an act of civil disobedience, they go
deer hunting on October 31. Although hunting season runs from
October 1 until October 31, Laura mistakenly believes the season
* J.D., Ph.D., LL.M., Associate Professor of Law, George Mason University School
of Law. The author wishes to thank Martin Golding and George Christie of Duke
University School of Law, Richard Greenstein of Temple University School of Law, and
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runs from September 15 to October 15, while Frank, who has just
returned from Japan, mistakenly believes the date to be November 1.
While hunting, they encounter a forest ranger to whom they proudly
confess their defiance of the law. The ranger promptly arrests Frank,
who is tried and convicted for attempting to hunt out of season, but
does not interfere with Laura, who has committed no crime.
A former dot-com millionaire, who has been reduced to
liquidating his property to stave off bankruptcy, parks his SUV along
a crowded street and offers to sell various electronic gadgets to
passing pedestrians. Jenny is one such pedestrian to whom he offers
his 700 MHz laptop computer for $400. Jenny concludes that the
computer must be stolen property, but buys it nonetheless. Thrilled
with her purchase, she shows the laptop to a man coming from the
opposite direction and says, "Hey, there's a guy selling 'hot'
electronic gear down the street for unbelievable prices. I got this
laptop for only $400." Unfortunately for her, the man is an
undercover police officer who places her under arrest. Jenny is tried
and convicted of attempting to receive stolen property.
Clarissa, the long-suffering wife of a philandering husband, is in
the habit of preparing him a cup of coffee with one spoonful of sugar
each morning. However, when he comes home at 3:00 a.m. with
lipstick smeared on his shirt collar, she decides that this is the final
straw. The next morning, she stirs what she believes to be a spoonful
of the arsenic she had purchased for this eventuality into his coffee.
When her husband gets up from the breakfast table, kisses her on the
cheek, and leaves for work, she realizes that she mistakenly added
sugar to his coffee, just as she does every morning. Taking this as a
sign from God to repent, she immediately goes to the police station to
confess. Clarissa is arrested for attempted murder and is tried and
convicted.1
With the exception of Laura, the protagonist in each of the
above dramas is being subjected to criminal punishment for
attempting crimes that could not possibly be produced by their
1. Each of these vignettes is derived from one of the classic illustrative cases
associated with the problem of impossible attempts. The first originated in Justice
Maxey's dissenting opinion in Commonwealth v. Johnson, 167 A. 344, 348 (Pa. 1933). The
second comes from Sanford Kadish and Monrad Paulsen's story of Mr. Fact and Mr. Law
that can be found in SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW
AND ITS PROCESSES 674 (5th ed. 1989). The third is an updated variant of the People v.
Jaffe, 78 N.E. 169, 169 (N.Y. 1906). And the fourth was apparently derived from the case
of State v. Clarissa, 11 Ala. 57, 60-61 (1847), in which a slave attempted to poison her
master with an innocuous substance.
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actions. Should they be? There is little 'question that in most
American jurisdictions the defendants would have no grounds on
which to appeal their convictions. Thirty-seven states have explicitly
eliminated impossibility as a defense to a charge of attempt 2 and the
federal circuits that have not done likewise have so limited the range
of application of the defense as to render it virtually a dead letter.3
As a result, one's susceptibility to punishment for attempting the
impossible is today a rather uncontroversial matter of settled law.
This was not always so. Thirty-four years ago Graham Hughes
wrote that:
2. Thirty-one states have eliminated the defense of impossibility by statute. See ALA.
CODE § 13A-4-2(b) (2000); ALASKA STAT. § 11.31.100(b) (Michie 2001); ARIz. REV.
STAT. § 13-1001(A)(1) (2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-3-201(a)(1) (Michie 2001); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 18-2-101(1) (2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-49(a)(1) (1999); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 531(1) (2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-4-4 (2000); HAW REV. STAT. § 705-
500(1)(a) (2000); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-4 (West 2000); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-
5-1(b) (West 2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21.3301(b) (2000); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
506.010(1) (Michie 2001); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:27(A) (West 2000); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17-A, § 152(2) (West 2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.17(2) (West 2000); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 564.011(2) (1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-4-103(2) (2000); NEB. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 28-201(1)(a) (Michie 2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 629:1(1) (2000); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:5-1(a)(1) (West 2001); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 110.10 (McKinney 2001);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-01(1) (2000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.02(B)
(Anderson 2001); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 44 (West 2000); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.425
(1999); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 901(b) (2000); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-12-101(a)(1) (2001);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-4-101(3)(b) (2000); WASH. REV. CODE § 9a.28.020(2) (2001);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-301 (Michie 2000). Seven states have eliminated the impossibility
defense by judicial decision. See Hudson v. State, 745 So. 2d 997, 1000 (Fla. 1999); State v.
Curtis, 603 A.2d 356, 359 (Vt. 1991); State v. Lopez, 669 P.2d 1086, 1087 (N.M. 1983); State
v. Ferreira, 463 A.2d 129. 132 (R.I. 1983); State v. Hageman, 296 S.E.2d 433, 451 (N.C.
1982); Duke v. State, 340 So. 2d 727, 730 (Miss. 1976); Darnell v. State, 558 P.2d 624, 625
(Nev. 1976).
3. See United States v. Quijada, 588 F.2d 1253, 1255 (9th Cir. 1978) (rejecting any
distinction between legal and factual impossibility and holding that "generally a defendant
should be treated in accordance with the facts as he supposed them to be"); United States
v. Parramore, 720 F. Supp. 799, 800 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (stating that "[sluffice it to say that
the common law has rejected the impossibility defense"); United States v. Heng Awkak
Roman, 356 F. Supp. 434, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), affd, 484 F.2d 1271 (2d Cir. 1973) (stating
that "however... impossibility may be categorized, [if] the defendants' objective ... was
criminal, impossibility is no defense"). Federal courts that have not explicitly rejected
impossibility as a defense have effectively rendered the question moot by examining the
legislative history of modern federal criminal statutes to find a Congressional intent to
eliminate the common law defense. See, e.g., United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 202 (3d
Cir. 1998) (holding that "Congress could not have intended E[conomic] E[spionage] A[ct]
attempt crimes to be subject to the somewhat obscure and rarely used common law
defense of legal impossibility"); United States v. Sobrilski, 127 F.3d 669, 674 (8th Cir.
1997) (holding that "in enacting section 406 of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse and




[t]he relevance on a charge of criminal attempt of the impossibility
of the accused's attaining his objective has for some time been a
subject of sharp dispute among jurists of the criminal law .... That
teachers of criminal law and writers in the field should devote time
and energy to this question is perfectly proper, for it is an important
question in a number of ways. It raises very basic interrogatories
concerning the aims and purposes of the criminal law; it compels us
to focus attention on concepts such as "intention" and "purpose,"
an analysis of which is indispensable to criminal law scholarship;
and it provides an excellent opp )rtunity for reflecting on the
pervasive and difficult distinction between mistake of fact and
mistake of law. For these reasons the problem is a splendid set-
piece which exhibits in a short space some of the most difficult
issues of criminal law analysis.4
How did the "splendid set piece.., of criminal law analysis" of a
generation ago come to be a matter of routine today?
The answer apparently lies in the confusion and frustration
courts experienced when trying to apply the common law rule
governing impossible attempts. The rule itself was clear. Legal
impossibility constituted a defense to a charge of attempt; factual
impossibility did not.5 An attempt was legally impossible "where the
intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime., 6 An
attempt was factually impossible "when extraneous circumstances
unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent consummation of
the intended crime."7 The confusion arose when courts tried to apply
the rule to cases because the categories are not mutually exclusive.
Consider, for example, the case of Jenny, the laptop purchaser,
described above. She completed all of her intended acts which did
not amount to a crime. Therefore, her attempt was legally
impossible.8 On the other hand, the fact that the laptop was not
stolen property was an extraneous circumstance unknown to her that
prevented the consummation of the intended crime. Therefore, her
4. Graham Hughes, One Further Footnote on Attempting the Impossible, 42 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1005, 1005 (1967).
5. See, e.g., Sobrilski, 127 F.3d at 674 ("Ordinarily, legal impossibility is a defense to a
charge of attempt, but factual impossibility is not."); United States v. Oviedo, 525 F.2d
881, 883 (5th Cir. 1976) ("The traditional analysis recognizes legal impossibility as a valid
defense, but refuses to so recognize factual impossibility."); People v. Dlugash, 363 N.E.2d
1155, 1160 (N.Y. 1977) ("A general rule developed in most American jurisdictions that
legal impossibility is a good defense but factual impossibility is not.").
6. United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 188 (3d Cir. 1973).
7. Id.
8. See People v. Jaffe, 78 N.E. 169 (N.Y. 1906).
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attempt was factually impossible.9 Consider also Clarissa, the long-
suffering wife. She too completed all of her intended acts which
amounted to sweetening her husband's coffee as she does every
morning; surely no crime. Therefore, her attempt was legally
impossible. However, she failed to murder her husband only because
she mistook sugar for arsenic, an extraneous circumstance that
prevented the consummation of the crime. Therefore, her attempt
was factually impossible. As these examples suggest, whether an
attempt is legally or factually impossible appears to depend more on
the way the court chooses to characterize the defendant's actions than
on the defendant's actions themselves.
This situation produced a howl of frustration from the judges
who had to apply the rule. Characterizing legal and factual
impossibility as "logically indistinguishable"'" and the distinction
between them as "a matter of semantics,"'1 courts found the common
law rule to be a "morass of confusion,"12 and "a source of utter
frustration."' 3 One court summed up the situation by stating:
[T]he application of the defense of impossibility is so fraught with
intricacies and artificial distinctions that the defense has little value
as an analytical method for reaching substantial justice.... We
think the effort to compartmentalize factual patterns into these
categories of factual or legal impossibility is but an illusory test
leading to contradictory, and sometimes absurd, results. 4
In the judicial equivalent of throwing up one's hands, courts both
rejected the impossibility defense whenever possible 5 and urged
legislatures to supplant the common law doctrine with a "progressive
and more modern view."' 6 The majority of state legislatures obliged,'7
usually adopting an attempt statute patterned on section 5.01 of the
Model Penal Code that eliminates the impossibility defense.'8 Thus,
9. See People v. Rojas, 358 P.2d 921, 922 (Cal. 1961).
10. United States v. Darnell, 545 F.2d 595, 597 (8th Cir. 1976). See also United States
v. Quijada, 588 F.2d at 1255 (eschewing any effort to distinguish between the two
concepts); United States v. Duran, 884 F. Supp. 577, 580 n.5 (D.D.C. 1995) ("categorizing
a case as involving legal versus factual impossibility is difficult, if not pointless"), affd, 96
F.3d 1495 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
11. United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 199 (3d Cir. 1998).
12. United States v. Thomas, 13 C.M.A. 278, 286 (1962).
13. Id. at 287.
14. State v. Moretti, 244 A.2d 499, 503 (N.J. 1968). See also United States v. Hair, 356
F. Supp. 339, 342 (D.D.C. 1973).
15. See supra note 2.
16. People v. Rollino, 233 N.Y.S.2d 580, 585 (1962).
17. See supra note 2.
18. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01, cmt. n.3.
November 20021 ATTEMPTING THE IMPOSSIBLE
courts now rarely if ever have to address the "splendid set piece ... of
criminal law analysis" of a generation ago.
In this Article, I will suggest that this is not necessarily a good
thing. With a little help from our fictional friends, Jean-Claude,
Laura, Frank, Clarissa, and Jenny, I hope to show that there was both
significant wisdom in and good normative grounding for the common
law impossibility defense. In Part I, I will argue that the distinction
between legal and factual impossibility is not nearly as impenetrable
as contemporary commentary suggests and that, in fact, the essence of
the distinction can be encapsulated in a single sentence. In Part II, I
will argue that the confusion regarding the distinction arose from the
difficulty that the early courts had in giving a clear explanation for the
basis of their decisions. I will claim that the courts were saying one
thing while doing another, and that by paying attention to what the
courts said rather than what they did, subsequent courts and
commentators stumbled into their "morass of confusion."' 9 In Part
III, I will examine the normative argument offered for the rejection of
the impossibility defense by the authors of the Model Penal Code and
other theorists who adopt what is known as a subjectivist approach to
the crime of attempt. In doing so, I will review the main objections to
the Model Penal Code's subjectivist approach and catalog the
responses the authors of the Code can make to each. In Part IV, I
will argue that there is a principled distinction between moral and
criminal responsibility, that the normative arguments supporting the
Model Penal Code's subjectivist approach are based on an improper
conflation of the two, and that a correct understanding of the nature
of criminal responsibility leaves the Code's position without
normative support. In Part V, I will argue that there is an inherent
liberal bias built into the Anglo-American criminal law that supplies a
principled basis for rejecting the Model Penal Code's definition of
attempt. Finally, in Part VI, I will propose a definition for attempt
that encompasses and extends the common law defense of
impossibility and rests upon a firm theoretical footing.
I. The Substance of the Common Law Doctrine
In the Introduction, I suggested that the courts lost patience with
the common law doctrine of impossibility because the categories of
legal and factual impossibility are not mutually exclusive. Indeed,
given the definitions assigned to these terms by the common law
19. United States v. Thomas, 13 C.M.A. 278, 286 (1962).
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decisions, they are not. But this implies only that the courts did a
poor job of labeling the distinction they were making, not that no
viable distinction exists. On the contrary, with some adjustment to
our terminology, it is quite easy to distinguish the class of cases in
which impossibility functioned as a defense at common law from
those in which it did not.
A perhaps apocryphal story about football coach Vince
Lombardi holds that following a bad game by the Green Bay Packers,
he began a team meeting by saying, "Let's get back to fundamentals.
This is a football." I believe an analogous approach can help
elucidate the substantive features of the impossibility defense to
attempt. This means beginning with the observation that "attempt is
a crime." As such, it consists of a guilty act, an actus reus, undertaken
with a guilty state of mind, a mens rea. The actus reus encompasses
more than merely the bodily movement of the defendant, referring to
an action that produces prohibited consequences and occurs under
legally specified circumstances. Thus, the actus reus of a crime
consists of three constituent elements: 1) a physical action, 2) its
consequences, and 3) its attendant circumstances .2  The mens rea
describes the state of mind the actor must have with regard to each
element of the actus reus.
Professor J.C. Smith has drawn a useful distinction between two
types of attendant circumstances. Smith distinguishes "pure" from
"consequential" circumstances. Pure circumstances are "[t]hose the
existence of which is not essential to the occurrence of the
consequences but is relevant to the legal effect of the consequences.
The relevance of these circumstances lies simply in that their
existence is required by the definition of the crime as a condition of
liability. 21  An example of a pure circumstance would be the
requirement for the crime of burglary that the breaking and entering
take place at night. This circumstance has no bearing on whether the
consequences of the burglary, the breaking and entering, actually
occur. However, because it is explicitly required by the definition of
the crime, there can be no liability for burglary without it.
Consequential circumstances are "[t]hose the existence of which is
essential to the occurrence of the consequences" but whose
"existence is not necessarily required by the definition of the
20. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 195 (2d ed.
1986); GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 16 (2d ed. 1961).
21. J.C. Smith, Two Problems in Criminal Attempts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 422, 424
(1957).
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crime. ... ,22 Examples of consequential circumstances would be: on
a charge of murder, whether the gun to be used is loaded; and "on a
charge of larceny, whether there was anything in the pocket into
which D put his hand with intent to steal.,
23
Because attempt is a crime, it can be fully described by specifying
its constituent actus reus and mens rea. What then is the actus reus of
attempt? Although it is too early in our analysis to answer this
question with precision,24 we can say at least that the actus reus of
attempt consists in trying and failing to commit another, completed
crime. The mens rea of attempt is a bit easier to specify. Attempt is a
specific intent crime, one whose mens rea requires two instances of
intention. To be liable for a specific intent crime, one must 1)
intentionally produce the actus reus of that crime while 2)
entertaining a further intention to do something or produce certain
consequences in the future.25 This further intention is the specific
intent. In the case of attempt, the required specific intent is the intent
to commit the completed crime.26  Thus, the mens rea of attempt
consists in intentionally taking the actions that constitute the actus
reus of attempt, i.e., the actions of trying and failing to commit a
completed crime, with the further intention to commit that crime.
Note that this implies that to be culpable for an attempt, one must act
with the specific intention to produce a state of affairs prohibited by
law.
This review of criminal law fundamentals should be sufficient for
us to unravel the common law doctrine of impossibility. Consider
first Laura, our anti-environmental rebel, who was trying to hunt out
of season. Laura's mistake about the law prevented her from
realizing her objective. Laura was not only not convicted of
22. Id. at 424-25.
23. Id. at 425.
24. Indeed, providing a definitive answer to this question is one of the ultimate
objectives of this article. See infra Part VI.
25. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL
LAW 202 (1972) ("the most common usage of 'specific intent' is to designate a special
mental element which is required above and beyond any mental state required with
respect to the actus reus of the crime"); ROLLIN M. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 762 (2d ed.
1969) ("Some crimes require a specified intention in addition to the intentional doing of
the actus reus itself .... This additional requirement is a 'specific intent,' an additional
intent specifically required for guilt of the particular offense.").
26. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 25, at 428 (1972) ("The mental state required
for the crime of attempt, as it is customarily stated in the cases, is an intent to commit
some other crime."); GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 137 (1978)
("It is generally agreed that the intent required for an attempt is the intent to effectuate
the offense-in-chief.").
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attempting to hunt out of season, she was not even arrested. Why
not?
The simple answer is that Laura does not possess the mens rea of
attempt. It is fair to say that Laura tried and failed to hunt out of
season, and hence that her actions constitute the actus reus of an
attempt. It is also fair to say that because she took these actions
intentionally, she has one of the two instances of intent requisite for
an attempt conviction. What is missing, however, is the specific
intent. To be culpable, Laura must also intend to commit a
completed crime, i.e., to produce consequences that are prohibited by
law. Despite the fact that Laura intends to produce consequences
that she mistakenly believes to be prohibited by law, she does not
intend to produce consequences that are prohibited by law.
Therefore, she does not possess the specific intent required by the
mens rea of attempt.
Laura has attempted to commit an imaginary crime. 8 One
attempts an imaginary crime when one makes a mistake of law such
that he or she "either believes that he [or she] violates a criminal
prohibition which, in reality, does not exist, or... wrongly expands
the scope of an existing criminal statute to his [or her]
disadvantage. 29 One who attempts to engage in illegal gambling in
Nevada or violate a motorcycle helmet law in a state that has not
enacted such a statute would be attempting to commit an imaginary
crime. Laura's mistake caused her to "wrongly expand the scope of
an existing criminal statute to [her] disadvantage." ' ° Our analysis
suggests that there should be no culpability in cases of imaginary
crimes because the defendant does not possess the mens rea of
attempt. Thus, as common sense would suggest, attempting to
commit an imaginary crime is not attempting to commit a crime."
27. See LAFAVE & SCOrT, supra note 20, at 516.
28. I adopt the phrase 'imaginary crime' to refer to this class of cases from Thomas
Weigend, Why Lady Eldon Should Be Acquitted: The Social Harm in Attempting the
Impossible, 27 DEPAUL L. REV. 231, 235 (1978). Cases of inculpatory mistakes of law
have also been referred to as illusory crimes. See Paul Kichyun Ryu, Contemporary
Problems of Criminal Attempts, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1170,1186 (1957).
29. Weigend, supra note 28, at 236.
30. Id.
31. There is nearly universal agreement that imaginary crimes are not culpable
attempts. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE:
[O]f course, it is still necessary that the result desired or intended by the actor
constitute a crime. If, according to his beliefs as to the facts and legal
relationships, the result desired or intended is not a crime, the actor will not be
guilty of an attempt even though he firmly believes that his goal is criminal.
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Consider next the case of Clarissa, our aggrieved wife. Clarissa
has made no mistake of law. What she tries to do-murder her
husband-is certainly prohibited by law. However, due to a mistake
about the condition of the world, i.e., the location of the arsenic, the
means she employs cannot possibly achieve her end. Clarissa has
made a mistake of fact that prevents her from producing the
consequences she desires which would constitute a murder.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01, cmt. 3 at 318 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960). See also HYMAN
GROSS, A THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 198 (1979) ("It is conceded universally that an
incorrect belief by the accused regarding his criminal liability cannot cause him to be
liable. Illustrations in the literature usually depict some mistake by the accused in
thinking that there is a law that makes what he does a crime."); Hughes, supra note 4, at
1006:
[Imaginary crime] describes a situation in which the objective of the accused...
does not constitute an offense known to the law, even though the accused may
mistakenly believe the law to be other than it is. Mistake of law may not
generally excuse, but neither can it in itself be a sufficient ground for indictment.
Oddly, the explanation given for this is almost never the lack of mens rea. Instead, most
commentators who address the issue argue that holding one culpable for an imaginary
crime would contravene the principle of legality, which holds that "conduct is not criminal
unless forbidden by law which gives advance warning that such conduct is criminal,"
LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 25, at 177, or that "there must be no crime or punishment
except in accordance with fixed, predetermined law," WILLIAMS, supra note 20, at 575.
The reasoning advanced is that because in the case of imaginary crimes there is no
prohibition against the conduct attempted, punishing the attempt would be to punish
without the necessary advance warning. See Weigend, supra note 28, at 235-36:
The second group of relatively "clear" cases could be called "imaginary
offenses."... Among the various reasons given for the defendant's impunity in
these cases, the most convincing seems to be that there is just no law under which
he could possibly be convicted. Thus, the imposition of punishment would
clearly contravene the principle of legality (nulla poena sine lege).
See also WILLIAMS, supra note 20, at 633-34:
It should need no demonstration that a person who commits or attempts to
commit what is not a crime in law cannot be convicted of attempting to commit a
crime, and it makes no difference that he thinks it is a crime.... For if the
legislature has not seen fit to prohibit the consummated act, a mere approach to
consummation should a fortiori be guiltless. Any other view would offend
against the principle of legality ....
See also LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 25, at 442:
The important point to keep in mind here is that one would not have to invent a
doctrine called legal impossibility to dispose of [imaginary crimes.] Rather, all
that is involved is an application of the principle of legality; the defendant did not
intend to do anything which had been made criminal, and what is not criminal
may not be turned into a crime after the fact by characterizing his acts as an
attempt.
This line of reasoning undoubtedly provides a good ground for excluding imaginary crimes
from the class of culpable attempts. It is, however, also a highly artificial one. It hardly
seems necessary to resort to the principle of legality to explain why there should be no
punishment in a class of cases in which the actors do not possess the mens rea required for
the offense.
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Employing Professor Smith's terminology, we can say that Clarissa is
laboring under a mistake of fact with regard to a consequential
circumstance.
By stirring sugar into her husband's coffee, Clarissa tried and
failed to kill him. It is therefore fair to say that her actions constitute
the actus reus of attempted murder. Further, Clarissa clearly
possesses the mens rea of attempt. She intentionally performed the
actions that constitute the actus reus of the attempt-stirring sugar
into her husband's coffee-and she did so with the further specific
intention to thereby cause her husband's death. Hence, Clarissa
appears to be a good candidate for conviction for attempted murder.
Due to a mistake about a consequential circumstance, Clarissa
has attempted to commit a crime by means that make it impossible
for her to succeed. Other cases that share the characteristics of
Clarissa's failed attempt include attempting to pick an empty pocket32
or to commit murder using an unloaded gun.3 Our analysis suggests
that in cases of this type in which the impossibility results from a
factual mistake about a consequential circumstance, conviction for
attempt is appropriate.
But now consider the case of Jenny, our pedestrian laptop
purchaser. Like Clarissa, Jenny is not mistaken about the law. What
she is trying to do-receive stolen property-is legally prohibited.
Also like Clarissa, Jenny has made a mistake about the condition of
the world, i.e., whether the laptop she purchased had been stolen.
Unlike Clarissa, however, Jenny's mistake of fact did not prevent her
from producing the consequences she intended to produce, i.e.,
obtaining a laptop at a low price. It did, however, prevent her from
producing the actus reus of the crime of receiving stolen property.
This is because Jenny was laboring under a mistake of fact with
regard to a pure circumstance, that is, a circumstance "the existence
of which is not essential to the occurrence of the consequences but is
relevant to the legal effect of the consequences.
' '
14
It appears that Jenny had the mens rea required for an attempt.
She intentionally took the actions by which she received the laptop
and she did so with the further specific intention to receive stolen
property. But what can we say about whether her actions constitute
the actus reus of an attempt to receive stolen property? On the one
hand, Jenny successfully accomplished her objective of obtaining a
32. See Regina v. Ring, 17 Cox Crim. L. Cas. 491 (1892) (Eng.).
33. See State v. Damms, 100 N.W.2d 592 (Wis. 1960).
34. Smith, supra note 21, at 424.
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laptop computer at a very low price. She does not appear to have
failed at anything at all, and had she known that the laptop was not in
fact stolen property, she would have been even more delighted with
her purchase. Given this, it seems odd to characterize Jenny's
activities as trying and failing to commit the crime of receiving stolen
property. Thus, one could argue that her activities do not constitute
the actus reus of an attempt. On the other hand, because Jenny
believed that the laptop was stolen property, it is not unreasonable to
say that she was trying to receive stolen property, and, because the
laptop was not stolen property, that she failed to accomplish this.
Thus, one could also argue that her actions do constitute the actus
reus of an attempt.
It appears that whether Jenny has produced the actus reus of an
attempt to receive stolen property depends on whether the object she
seeks to obtain is characterized as a low-priced laptop or as putative
stolen property. Fortunately, it is not necessary to resolve this
question at the moment. For now, we can simply say that a
preliminary analysis in terms of the fundamental concepts of criminal
law leaves us uncertain as to whether Jenny should be liable to
conviction for attempting to receive stolen property.
Due to a mistake of fact about a pure circumstance, Jenny has
achieved an objective that she believed to be criminal without thereby
committing a crime. Other examples of this type of impossible
attempt are attempting to steal one's own umbrella35 or to distribute a
controlled substance by distributing an uncontrolled substance.36 At
present, our analysis leaves us uncertain as to whether there should
be a conviction in cases such as these in which the impossibility results
from a mistake of fact about a pure circumstance.
We are now in a position to give a clear account of the common
law impossibility doctrine. At common law, a factually impossible
attempt was one in which the impossibility arose from a mistake of
fact with regard to a consequential circumstance, the type of mistake
Clarissa made. Factual impossibility was no defense at common law,
a result which squares with our analysis of Clarissa's situation above.
A legally impossible attempt was either an imaginary crime or one in
which the impossibility arose from a mistake of fact with regard to a
pure circumstance, the type of mistake Jenny made. Legal
impossibility was a common law defense, a result which squares with
35. See Regina v. Collins, 9 Cox Crim. Cas. 497, 498 (1864) (Eng.).
36. See United States v. Oviedo, 525 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1976).
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our analysis of imaginary crimes such as Laura's, and resolves our
uncertainty about Jenny's situation in favor of finding no liability.
The common law decisions overwhelmingly support this analysis.
With the exception of a few nineteenth century English cases,37 almost
all cases in which an attempt was impossible because of the
defendant's mistake of fact with regard to a consequential
circumstance have been classified as factually impossible and the
conviction upheld. Thus, attempts to pick empty pockets," perform
abortions on women who were not pregnant,39 commit rape when
impotent," and kill someone already dead," or with an inadequate
dose of poison42 or an unloaded gun,43 or by shooting into an empty
bed' or in the wrong direction45 have all been held to give rise to
attempt liability. 6  In addition, almost all cases in which attempt
convictions have been reversed on the grounds of legal impossibility
are either cases of imaginary crimes or those in which the defendant
made a mistake of fact with regard to a pure circumstance. Thus,
convictions have been reversed for attempting to commit forgery by
altering a non-material portion of a check,47 attempting to receive
stolen property by receiving non-stolen property4 8 attempting to
suborn perjury by soliciting false testimony on an immaterial matter 9
37. See FLETCHER, supra note 26, at 146-47.
38. See People v. Fiegelman, 91 P.2d 156 (Cal. Ct. App. 1937).
39. See State v. Moretti, 244 A.2d 499 (N.J. 1968).
40. See Preddy v. Commonwealth, 36 S.E.2d 549 (Va. Ct. App. 1946).
41. See People v. Dlugash, 363 N.E.2d 1155 (N.Y. 1977).
42. See Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 48 N.E. 770 (Mass. 1897).
43. See State v. Damms, 100 N.W.2d 592 (Wis. 1960).
44. See State v. Mitchell, 71 S.W. 175 (Mo. 1902).
45. See People v. Lee Kong, 30 P. 800 (Cal. 1892).
46. See Ira P. Robbins, Attempting the Impossible: The Emerging Consensus, 23
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 377, 379-83 n.10, 16-19 (1986) (listing fifty-two cases in which
mistakes about consequential circumstances were held to be cases of factual impossibility
giving rise to attempt liability).
47. See Wilson v. State, 38 So. 46 (Miss. 1905). This is probably the only reported case
of attempting an imaginary crime. That there have been few such cases is unsurprising
since in cases in which one "believes that he violates a criminal prohibition which, in
reality, does not exist," Weigend, supra note 28, at 236, it is not even clear how the
prosecutor would frame the charges. Wilson was the type of imaginary crime in which the
defendant "wrongly expand[ed] the scope of an existing criminal statute to his
disadvantage." Id. Wilson thought he was committing forgery by altering the numerals on
a check. Forgery, however, required the alteration of a material part of the document and
the numerals were not material. He was thus laboring under a mistake of law that caused
him to believe his action to be criminal when it was not. Id.
48. See People v. Jaffe, 78 N.E. 169 (N.Y. 1906).
49. See People v. Teal, 89 N.E. 1086 (N.Y. 1909). Teal is often incorrectly treated by
commentators as though it were a case of attempting an imaginary crime, or in the more
commonly employed terminology, an example of "pure legal impossibility." See Fernand
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attempting rape by having forcible intercourse with one's wife,"
attempting to distribute a controlled substance by distributing an
uncontrolled substance,5 and attempting to smuggle letters out of
prison without the warden's knowledge when the warden was aware
of the smuggling. 2 Far from involving the "highly abstract issues that
are notorious for their degree of difficulty"53 that were decried by
courts and commentators, the common law distinction between
factual and legal impossibility is really quite simple. Because cases of
true imaginary crimes almost never arise, courts can accurately and
easily categorize attempts as legally or factually impossible by
focusing on whether the defendant was mistaken about the existence
of a pure or consequential circumstance. Discounting imaginary
crimes, the common law doctrine of impossibility can be summed up
in a single sentence: impossibility is a defense to a charge of attempt
if it results from the defendant's mistake concerning a pure
circumstance.
II. Theory and Confusion
In Part I, I argued that impossibility constituted a defense to a
charge of attempt at common law if it arose from the defendant's
mistake concerning the existence of a pure circumstance. If things
really are as simple as that, what accounts for all the confusion over
the issue? After all, the courts were not the only ones to regard the
doctrine of impossibility as a "morass of confusion."54 Virtually all
N. Dutile & Harold F. Moore, Mistake and Impossibility: Arranging a Marriage Between
Two Difficult Partners, 74 Nw. U. L. REV. 166, 181-84 (1979); Robbins, supra note 46, at
390-94. In Teal, the defendant was convicted of attempting to suborn perjury for trying to
convince a witness to lie concerning an act of adultery that had never been alleged and
therefore was not material to a divorce case. This is not a case of attempting an imaginary
crime because Teal was not making a mistake of law. He did not erroneously construe the
scope of subornation of perjury to include immaterial testimony. Rather, he mistakenly
believed that the act of adultery concerning which he was attempting to procure false
testimony had been alleged and thus was material. This is a mistake of fact as to a pure
circumstance. It did not interfere with the production of the consequences he intended,
the obtaining of false testimony on the immaterial act of adultery, but it did prevent his
action from amounting to the subornation of perjury. 89 N.E. 1086.
50. See Frazier v. State, 86 S.W. 754 (Tex. Crim. App. 1905). At the time, one of the
pure circumstances for conviction for rape was that the victim not be one's spouse.
Although the actual charge in this case was assault with intent to rape rather than
attempted rape, the court's reasoning equally applies to an attempt charge. See United
States v. Thomas, 13 C.M.A. 278, 299 (1962).
51. See United States v. Oviedo, 525 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1976).
52. See United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1973).
53. Dutile & Moore, supra note 49, at 166.
54. Thomas, 13 C.M.A. at 286.
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academic commentators who address the subject begin with a
reference to the conceptual difficulty of the distinctions involved.
Thus, the impossibility doctrine is declared to be "quicksand"5 or "an
intellectual quagmire"56 that "has resulted in extreme confusion ' ' 7 and
constitutes "the most intractable problem of all."58 How could what is
essentially a simple distinction give rise to so much intellectual
tumult?
The simple answer may be that courts and commentators paid
too much attention to what judges said and not enough to what they
did. To explain what I mean, let me begin with a brief digression on
the behavioral significance of making a mistake about a consequential
as opposed to a pure circumstance. Recall that a consequential
circumstance is one "the existence of which is essential to the
occurrence of the consequences"59 of the completed crime. Thus,
defendants who are mistaken about the existence of a consequential
circumstance are prevented from achieving tbeir objectives. Were
such defendants to become aware of their mistake, they would change
their behavior to make it possible for them to attain their ends. For
example, when one attempts to kill with an Ufiloaded gun, he or she is
mistaken with regard to the consequential circumstance as to whether
the gun is loaded. The mistake mkes it impossible for the defendant
to achieve his or her objective of killing the victim. If the defendant
became aware that the gun was not loaded, he or she would surely
load it.
A pure circumstance, on the other hand, is one "the existence of
which is not essential to the occurrence of the consequences"" of the
55. Kenneth W. Simons, Mistake and Impossibility, Law and Fact, and Culpability: A
Speculative Essay, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 447,448 (1990).
56. Id.
57. PERKINS, supra note 25, at 570.
58. Arnold N. Enker, Impossibility in Criminal Attempts-Legality and the Legal
Process, 53 MINN. L. REV. 665, 665 (1969). See also Kyle S. Brodie, The Obviously
Impossible Attempt: A Proposed Revision to the Model Penal Code, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
237, 238 (1995) ("The debate surrounding the impossibility defense was in large part
instigated by the confusion and frustration surrounding the common law history of
impossibility."); Dutile & Moore, supra note 49, at 166 ("Questions concerning legal
impossibility involve highly abstract issues that are notorious for their degree of
difficulty."); Jerome B. Elkind, Impossibility in Criminal Attempts: A Theorist's Headache,
54 VA. L. REV. 20, 20 (1968) ("The question of when an unsuccessful attempt at
committing a crime becomes a crime in itself is rife with conceptual difficulties, and where
the attempt cannot possibly attain the intended criminal goal, these difficulties are
compounded.").
59. Smith, supra note 21, at 424.
60. Id.
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completed crime. Defendants who are mistaken about the existence
of a pure circumstance are therefore not prevented from producing
the consequences they intend to produce and achieving their ends.
Were such defendants to become aware of their mistake, they would
not change their behavior in any way. For example, when one
attempts to burglarize a home believing it to be 5:00 a.m. when it is
actually 7:00 a.m., he or she is mistaken with regard to the pure
circumstance of whether it is night. The mistake does not interfere in
any way with the defendant achieving his or her objective of breaking
into the home. If made aware of the true time, the defendant would
simply proceed with the breaking and entering, although he or she
might be relieved to know that there could be no liability for burglary
for doing so.
Now consider what the common law judges did when faced with
a case involving an impossible attempt. Keep in mind that originally
such judges did not see themselves as drawing a distinction between
legal and factual impossibility. Their task was simply to determine
whether the defendant before them should be liable for punishment
for an attempt. Because in virtually every case the defendant had the
necessary mens rea,6" this meant deciding whether the defendant's
actions constituted the actus reus of an attempt. But because the law
provided no specific guidance on how to deal with impossible
attempts,62 judges had to make this determination on the basis of
ordinary English usage and common sense notions of what
constituted an attempt.63 In ordinary usage, an attempt is a try or an
61. As discussed above, see supra note 47, mens rea was lacking only in cases of
imaginary crimes which were exceedingly rare. Wilson v. State, 38 So. 46 (Miss. 1905), is
one of the few reported such cases.
62. The legal rules governing impossibility, that legal impossibility was a defense and
factual impossibility was not, were, of course, later day derivations from the decisions
common law judges made throughout the latter part of the nineteenth century and first
part of the twentieth.
63. See FLETCHER, supra note 26, at 161 (arguing that "[w]hen the law itself provides
no guidance to the meaning of one of its critical terms, we have to fall back on the source
of Anglo-American legal terms-namely, the English language"-and thus that an
adequate theory of attempts "depends on its providing an account of what ordinary people
mean when they talk about 'trying' or 'attempting' to do something"). See also Lawrence
Crocker, Justice in Criminal Liability: Decriminalizing Harmless Attempts, 53 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1057, 1072 (1992):
The way ordinary speakers use a term will not necessarily control the contours of
the legal concept answering to that term, but if the term is used in a statute,
particularly a criminal statute, adopting a broader interpretation of the term
requires a good reason. To criminalize an act as an "attempt," it prima facie
ought to be an "attempt" in ordinary parlance.
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effort to achieve an objective. ' In the context of the criminal law in
which attempt could be charged only when the defendant had failed
to commit a completed crime, ordinary usage and common sense
suggested that an attempt was an unsuccessful try or a failed effort to
achieve a criminal objective.65 Thus, judges typically, and not
unexpectedly, found attempt liability where defendants had tried and
failed to obtain a criminal objective and found no liability where the
defendants' actions did not fit this model.
What results did this decision process produce? Because
mistakes about consequential circumstances prevented defendants
from attaining their goals, defendants who made such mistakes always
fit the model of those who had tried and failed to achieve a criminal
objective. As a result, common law judges almost always found that
the actions of such defendants constituted the actus reus of an attempt
and upheld their convictions.66 On the other hand, mistakes about
pure circumstances did not prevent defendants from attaining their
goals. The actions of such defendants are not conveniently described
as unsuccessful tries or failed efforts, as we saw in our discussion of
Jenny's actions in Part 1.67 As a result, common law judges were
unlikely to view the actions of these defendants as the actus reus of an
attempt and would overturn their convictions.' Thus, by responding
in a perfectly natural way to the need to decide the cases before them,
the common law courts produced a division between culpable and
non-culpable impossible attempts on the basis of whether the
defendant's mistake concerned a consequential or pure
circumstance. 69 Failed attempts to pick empty pockets would support
64. The Oxford English Dictionary defines an attempt as "a putting forth of effort to
accomplish what is uncertain or difficult; a trial, essay, endeavor .... 1 OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 764 (1989).
65. Thus, the OED's second definition for attempt is "the effort in contrast with the
attainment of its object; effort merely, futile endeavor." Id. An excellent example of the
court's appeal to the ordinary meaning of attempt is supplied by People v. Moran, 25 N.E.
412, 413 (N.Y. 1890), in which the court helped justify its ruling by observing that "[miany
efforts have been made to reach the North Pole, but none have thus far succeeded, and
many have grappled with the theory of perpetual motion without success-possibly from
the fact of its non-existence-but can it be said in either case that the attempt was not
made?"
66. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
67. See supra pp. 11-12.
68. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
69. For the reasons discussed below, see infra text accompanying notes 78-100, very
few commentators see this as the basic distinction between factual and legal impossibility.
George Fletcher, however, clearly recognizes the significance of the distinction. In
Rethinking Criminal Law, Fletcher sought to explain how to distinguish culpable from
non-culpable attempts in cases in which the attempted crime was a regulatory offense or a
November 2002]
liability; successful attempts to receive property erroneously believed
to be stolen would not.
Why then did commentators fail to recognize this distinction? I
believe it is because the language the courts used to justify their
decisions suggested that a different distinction was being made. In
the cases in which convictions for impossible attempts were upheld,
the early opinions fairly explicitly justified the convictions on the
basis of the ordinary meaning of an attempt. These opinions
invariably characterized an attempt as a failed effort. The fact that
the effort could not possibly succeed in no way changed its character
as a failed effort, and therefore could not shield the defendant from
liability for attempt.7 '  In making this point, however, the courts
derivative crime whose consequences are not harmful in themselves, i.e., "that in
themselves do not threaten the core interests protected under the criminal law."
FLETCHER, supra note 26, at 160 (1978). As examples of such offenses, Fletcher gives
receiving stolen property, citing People v. Jaffe, 78 N.E. 169 (N.Y. 1906), and smuggling
letters out of prison, citing United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1973).
Fletcher argues that distinguishing culpable from non-culpable attempts in such cases
requires a test that tells us when a mistake as to an attendant circumstance will be
inculpatory. As he puts it, "It is little help to say that he must be mistaken about an
'attendant circumstance,' for until we formulate a general test for the relevance of
mistaken beliefs on the concept of attempting, there is no way of specifying which
'attendant circumstances' ought to fall within the description of the attempted act."
FLETCHER, supra note 26, at 160. The test Fletcher proposes is his rational motivation
test which identifies mistaken beliefs as relevant when they "affect [the defendant's]
incentive in acting. They affect his incentive if knowing of the mistake would give him a
good reason for changing his course of conduct." Id. at 161. For the reasons discussed
above, see supra text accompanying note 59-60, this definition implies that consequential
circumstances are always relevant and pure circumstances are not. Thus, Fletcher's
rational motivation test is functionally equivalent to a test that distinguishes between
consequential and pure circumstances. This is evidenced by the fact that he would not
hold either Jaffe or Berrigan culpable for an attempt.
In a later work, Fletcher apparently broadens the range of application of his rational
motivation test beyond mere regulatory or derivative offenses. See George P. Fletcher,
Constructing a Theory of Impossible Attempts, 5 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 53 (1986).
70. See, e.g., People v. Lee Kong, 30 P. at 801 ("[W)here the criminal result of an
attempt is not accomplished simply because of an obstruction in the way of the thing to be
operated upon, and these facts are unknown to the aggressor at the time, the criminal
attempt is committed."); State v. Wilson, 30 Conn. 500, 506 (1862) ("[Tjhe only safe rule
is, that the attempt is complete and punishable, when an act is done with intent to commit
the crime, which is adapted to the perpetration of it, whether the purpose fails by reason
of interruption, or because there was nothing in the pocket, or for other extrinsic cause.") ;
Kunkle v. State, 32 Ind. 220, 232 (1869) ("[W]here the object is not accomplished, simply
because of obstructions in the way, or because of the want of the thing to be operated
upon, when the impediment is of a nature to be wholly unknown to the offender, who used
appropriate means, the criminal attempt is committed."); People v. Moran, 25 N.E. at 413
("An attempt is made when an opportunity occurs, and the intending perpetrator has done
some act tending to accomplish his purpose, although he is baffled by an unexpected
obstacle or condition.").
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regularly characterized the cause of the effort's failure in terms of
unknown facts,71 unexpected obstacles," extrinsic causes,73 and similar
language that suggested a factual error or physical impediment.
The courts had more difficulty explaining their decisions in the
cases in which convictions for impossible attempts were overturned.
Because in these cases the defendants' errors about pure
circumstances did not prevent them from achieving their objectives,
their actions did not fit the model of a failed effort and did not square
with the ordinary meaning of "attempt." However, it would not do
for courts to simply declare that a defendant's conviction must be
reversed because his or her actions did not look like an attempt.7 4 But
without the benefit of the terminology we are retroactively applying,
courts found it difficult to specify the class of cases for which they
considered attempt liability inappropriate. As a result, they groped
for a description of the distinction they were after with locutions such
as: "[i]f all which an accused person intends to do would, if done,
constitute no crime, it cannot be a crime to attempt to do with the
same purpose a part of the thing intended"75 and "[i]f the thing
defendant attempted to do would not and could not, under the
statute, have been a crime if accomplished, how can it be said that he
attempted to commit the denounced crime, however reprehensible
may have been his intent from the standpoint of morals?"76
Unfortunately, these descriptions are highly ambiguous and
depend on how one interprets phrases such as "what an accused
person intends to do." Is "what an accused person intends to do"
merely to produce the consequences he or she seeks or is it to
produce these consequences under the attendant circumstances as he
or she believes them to be? Should the accused person's intent ignore
or incorporate his or her mistaken belief about the pure
71. See Lee Kong, 30 P. at 801.
72. See Moran, 25 N.E. at 413.
73. See Wilson, 30 Conn. at 506.
74. Although in certain early cases, the court's rationale amounted to little more than
that. See Nicholson v. State, 25 S.E. 360 (Ga. 1896) ("[lit does not appear that the act
which the accused attempted to procure Whittier to commit would have amounted to the
crime of perjury, if such attempt had resulted successfully.").
75. People v. Jaffe, 78 N.E. 169, 170 (N.Y. 1906).
76. State v. Taylor, 133 S.W.2d 336, 340 (Mo. 1939). See also People v. Teal, 89 N.E.
1086, 1090 (N.Y. 1909):
Without it the crime cannot be committed, no matter what the intent may be.
The same rule applies to subornation, and where there is neither perjury nor
subornation thereof, there can be no such attempt to commit either of these
crimes as to fall within the statutes relating to attempts at commission of crimes.
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circumstances? Was Jenny's intention to receive a 700 MHz laptop or
was it to receive a stolen laptop?
If the former, then the courts' language would refer to a class of
cases that includes both mistakes about pure circumstances and
imaginary crimes. When the desired consequences are viewed
objectively, a defendant can be said to "intend" to produce
consequences that he or she believes to be criminal but which are not
both when a necessary pure circumstance is missing and when he or
she mistakenly believes the consequences to be legally prohibited. If
Jenny's intention is to receive a 700 MHz laptop, then she can believe
this to be a criminal activity either because she believes the laptop to
be stolen property or because she believes purchasing such a machine
for less than $500 violates a non-existent price regulation.
On the other hand, if "what an accused person intends to do"
incorporates the defendant's mistaken belief, then the courts'
language can refer only to imaginary crimes. When the desired
consequences are viewed from the defendant's perspective, the
defendant intends to produce criminal consequences. But the only
way one can intend to produce criminal consequences that are not in
fact criminal is to be mistaken about what is legally prohibited. If
Jenny's intention is to receive a stolen 700 MHz laptop, then the only
way this could not be criminal would be if the jurisdiction did not
have a statute prohibiting the receipt of stolen property.
It should be apparent that the courts' language in these cases was
sure to create confusion. We know the courts were trying to identify
the class of cases in which defendants made a mistake of fact about a
pure circumstance because virtually all of the cases in which the
relevant language was employed have this characteristic. 7  This
implies that the courts were viewing "what an accused person intends
to do" from an objective standpoint. But nothing in the courts'
language suggests that this, rather than the defendant's perspective, is
the proper interpretative viewpoint. And even if the language is
interpreted as the courts apparently intended, it is still problematic in
that it refers not only to cases of mistake of fact about a pure
circumstance, but also to imaginary crimes involving mistakes of law.
In fact, phrases such as "[i]f all which an accused person intends to do
would, if done, constitute no crime" and "[i]f the thing defendant
attempted to do would not and could not.., have been a crime if
accomplished" seem more suggestive of mistakes of law than mistakes
of fact.
77. As noted above, Wilson, 38 So. 46, is an exception. See supra note 47.
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The courts' difficulty articulating the basis for their decisions in
cases of impossible attempts produced the following situation for
those seeking to explain when impossibility could serve as a defense.
In virtually all the reported cases of impossible attempts, the
defendant had made a mistake of fact. The factor that actually
determined whether the defendant's conviction would be upheld was
what kind of circumstance the mistake of fact was about;
consequential or pure. But judicial opinions in the cases that upheld
attempt convictions misleadingly emphasized the factual nature of the
defendant's mistake rather than that the mistake caused the failure of
the defendant's efforts. And judicial opinions in the cases that
overturned attempt convictions used language that could be
interpreted either to include or to exclude the class of cases the
courts' were seeking to identify and, in addition, misleadingly
suggested that the defendant had made a mistake of law. Thus, legal
analysts were faced with a situation in which the opinions they were
analyzing directed their attention away from the distinction that was
doing the work and toward a specious distinction between mistake of
fact or physical impediment and mistake of law.
Although specious, the distinction between factual mistake and
legal mistake was seductive. This is due, in part, to the well-known
role the distinction plays with regard to completed crimes. An
elementary tenet of criminal law is that mistake of fact can negate
mens rea and thus criminal culpability, but mistake or ignorance of
the law cannot."M There is an appealing intellectual elegance to the
observation that in the case of the inchoate crime of attempt, it is
mistake of law that defeats liability and mistake of fact that does not.
Furthermore, for the most part, this observation is correct. Mistake
of law, which cannot exculpate in the case of completed crimes, also
cannot inculpate in the case of attempt. The belief that gambling is
legal will not relieve one of liability for illegal gambling in New York,
and the belief that gambling is illegal will not subject one to liability
for attempted illegal gambling in Nevada. In addition, because
factual mistakes usually concern a consequential circumstance, in
most cases a mistake of fact, which can exculpate in the case of
completed crimes, also can inculpate in the case of attempt. The
belief that a gun was not loaded can relieve one of liability for
murder, and the belief that a gun was loaded can subject one to
liability for attempted murder. The desire to assimilate attempt
doctrine symmetrically into the established doctrine of mistake of fact
78. See LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 20, § 5.1(a).
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and mistake of law created a powerful temptation to overlook the
qualifying phrase "in most cases.""
In the end, this temptation proved too powerful for many
commentators to resist. The very practice of referring to the
distinction between culpable and non-culpable impossible attempts as
the distinction between factual and legal impossibility reinforced the
impression that factual errors were invariably, rather than usually,
inculpatory and that exculpatory errors necessarily concerned matters
of law. 0 As a result, many commentators found cases of factual
mistakes about pure consequences anomalous. Cases such as Jenny's
that contained exculpatory mistakes of fact disrupted the elegant
symmetry of the mistake of fact/mistake of law distinction. The
commentators who were bothered by this tended to view these as
cases in which the courts were confused or had made a mistake.
Thus, Francis Sayre, one of the earliest commentators, played upon
the ambiguity of the phrases such as "what an accused person intends
to do" to argue that courts that overturned convictions in cases of
mistake as to pure circumstances had failed to appreciate that one of
the defendant's objectives had been criminal. 1  Once this is
recognized, he contended, it would be apparent that impossibility
resulting from mistake of fact cannot exculpate.82 Robert Skilton,
another early commentator, exploited the same ambiguity to contend
that the courts' mischaracterization of the defendant's intent in cases
like Jenny's caused them to incorrectly overturn the convictions.83
Similarly, Jerome Hall regarded the idea of legal impossibility as
merely "an awkward expression of the principle of legality,"84
79. See, e.g., Andrew Ashworth, Criminal Attempts and the Role of Resulting Harm
under the Code, and in the Common Law, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 725, 757-58 (1988) (discussing
the Model Penal Code, stating, "The thrust of both sections is that liability should be
based on the facts or circumstances as the actor believed them to be, thereby promoting a
symmetry between the exculpatory and inculpatory provisions in the law.").
80. Examined in isolation, there is nothing necessarily misleading about the factual
impossibility/legal impossibility label. Factual impossibility is not an inaccurate way of
describing an effort that, due to a factual mistake about the state of the world, cannot
possibly succeed. And legal impossibility is a reasonable way of indicating that, due to a
factual mistake about a pure circumstance, a defendant's successful effort cannot
constitute a crime. This labeling would be misleading only in the absence of knowledge
that the focus of the distinction is whether the defendant's effort has succeeded or failed.
This, however, is exactly the situation the early courts and commentators were in.
81. Francis Bowes Sayre, Criminal Attempts, 41 HARV. L. REV. 821, 838-39, 853-54
(1928).
82. Id. at 854.
83. Robert H. Skilton, The Requisite Act in a Criminal Attempt, 3 U. PITT. L. REV.
308, 312 (1937).
84. JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 586 (2d ed. 1947).
[Vol. 54
ATTEMPTING THE IMPOSSIBLE
indicating that he identified it exclusively with attempts to commit
imaginary crimes and regarded the interpretation that included
mistakes about pure consequences as "untenable." 5
The later commentators who felt the allure of the mistake of
law/mistake of fact doctrine similarly had their attention drawn in an
inappropriate direction. In the decided cases, the key distinction was
between mistakes of fact about consequential circumstances and
mistakes of fact about pure circumstances. The question of whether
the defendant had made a mistake of law and attempted an imaginary
crime was, at best, of tangential significance since almost no cases
involved such mistakes. The mistake of fact/mistake of law
distinction placed the focus on the difference between imaginary
crimes and all mistakes of fact, and relegated the distinction between
factual mistakes as to pure versus consequential circumstances to a
subsidiary, and apparently superfluous, role. This was eventually
reflected in the terminology the commentators employed. Imaginary
crimes came to be referred to as cases of "pure legal impossibility,"
' 6
while all cases of mistake of fact were referred to as either "pure
factual impossibility"87 or simply "factual impossibility."8  Cases of
factual mistakes abou, pure circumstances were given the anomalous
appellations of "mixed legal and factual impossibility,"" "mixed
fact/law impossibility,"' or even "'legal (?)' impossibility."'" As this
terminology suggests, those employing it almost always regarded the
courts' failure to uphold convictions in cases of factual mistake about
pure circumstances as erroneous. For example, Professor Simons
believes that the very specification of these cases as a separate class is
based on an erroneous belief that they involve a mistake of law,92 and
that "[tlhe category of traditional 'legal (?)' impossibility is therefore
conceptually confused and essentially indistinguishable from the
category of factual impossibility."93
Of course, not all commentators were seduced into viewing the
distinction between culpable and non-culpable impossible attempts
85. Id. at 590-91.
86. Dutile & Moore, supra note 49, at 181; Robbins, supra note 46, at 389.
87. Dutile & Moore, supra note 49, at 183.
88. Robbins, supra note 46, at 380.
89. Dutile & Moore, supra note 49, at 184.
90. Robbins, supra note 46, at 394.
91. Simons, supra note 55, at 472.
92. See id. ("This categorization of 'legal (?)' impossibility is spurious: it does not
describe cases of legal mistake or ignorance at all. Rather, it captures one category of
factual impossibility cases.").
93. Id. at 474.
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purely in terms of the mistake of law/mistake of fact distinction.
Among those who were not, however, the language the courts had
employed was sufficiently misleading so that few saw the distinction
in terms of the failed effort/successful effort model.94  Thus,
commentators sought the crucial distinguishing element in factors as
diverse as whether the defendant's actions were overt or innocent,9
were reasonable or unreasonable, 96 invaded a legally protected
interest,97 were sufficient to cause public alarm,98 threatened harm, 99 or
were apt."° The result of all this was that when the courts looked to
the academic commentary for guidance on impossible attempts, they
met with a frustrating lack of consensus,"' which was then cited as a
reason for abandoning the effort to make a distinction at all.
In sum, it seems likely that impossible attempts came to be
regarded as "a morass of confusion"' "' because although the early
courts distinguished culpable from non-culpable impossible attempts
in an entirely natural and common sense way, they did a poor job of
describing the distinction they made. By describing the distinction
between factual mistakes about pure versus consequential
circumstances with language that suggested a distinction between
mistake of fact and mistake of law, many commentators were led to
view the distinction in terms of the conventional mistake of
fact/mistake of law doctrine for completed crimes. These
commentators adopted terminology that reinforced the focus on the
94. Two notable exceptions to this rule are Professors J.C. Smith and Graham Hughes.
See Smith, supra note 21, at 422; J.C. Smith, Two Problems in Criminal Attempts Re-
Examined-Il, 1962 CRiM. L. REV. 212; Hughes, supra note 4.
95. See Enker, supra note 58.
96. See Elkind, supra note 58; Sayre, supra note 81.
97. See Ian H. Dennis, Preliminary Crimes and Impossibility, 31 C. L. P. 31 (1978);
John S. Strahorn, Jr., The Effect of Impossibility on Criminal Attempts, 78 U. PA. L. REV.
962 (1930).
98. See Weigend, supra note 28.
99. GROSS, supra note 31, at 196.
100. FLETCHER, supra note 26, § 3.3.
101. See, e.g., United States v. Hair, 356 F. Supp. 339, 342 (D.D.C. 1973) ("Added to the
lack of uniformity among other jurisdictions on this issue is the morass of commentary
surrounding the defense of impossibility in attempt crimes."); United States v. Thomas, 13
C.M.A. 278, 283 (1962) (citing commentators and text writers to conclude "[w]hat is
abundantly clear ... is that it is most difficult to classify any particular state of facts as
positively coming within one of these categories to the exclusion of the other); Booth v.
State, 398 P.2d 863, 870 (Okla. Crim. App. 1964) (citing several commentators and
concluding that "[d]etailed discussion of the subject is unnecessary to make it clear that it
is frequently most difficult to compartmentalize a particular set of facts as coming within
one of the categories rather than the other").
102. Thomas, 13 C.M.A. at 286.
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fact/law distinction: first by labeling the distinction as factual versus
legal impossibility, and later by refining this into the distinctions
among pure legal impossibility, mixed fact/law impossibility, and
factual impossibility. Because this was not the distinction the courts
actually employed, the decided cases did not fit conveniently into the
academic categories. Furthermore, even among the commentators
who were not seduced by the intellectual elegance of the mistake of
fact/mistake of law analogy, the courts' language was imprecise
enough to allow for various interpretations of the distinction. As a
result, the efforts made by later courts to apply the academic
distinctions were maddeningly difficult, which, in turn, led the courts
to abandon the effort or ask the legislatures to do away with the
impossibility defense. Thus, by paying more attention to what the
courts said than what they did, courts and commentators sounded the
death knell of the impossibility defense.
III. The Subjectivist Challenge
In Part II, I suggested that the confusion that served as the
impetus for the rejection of the impossibility defense to a charge of
attempt resulted from the courts' difficulty describing what was really
a rather simple distinction. Had the courts and commentators been
able to describe the distinction between culpable and non-culpable
impossible attempts as the difference between a factual mistake as to
a consequential or pure circumstance, they may have had no trouble
applying it. This suggests that the difficulty of deciphering the
common law distinction was not an adequate reason for its rejection.
Of course, the fact that the common law impossibility defense
was intelligible does not mean that it was normatively justified. To
say that it should not have been discarded as unworkable is not to say
that it should not have been discarded. It may well be that under the
properly understood common law distinction, Jenny, who made a
factual mistake about a pure circumstance, would not be subject to
punishment for attempt, while Clarissa, who made a factual mistake
about a consequential circumstance, would be. But how can this
differential treatment be justified? Aren't Clarissa and Jenny equally
blameworthy? Didn't they both intend to violate the law and haven't
they each demonstrated their willingness to act on this intention?
Both would have violated the law if the facts were as they believed




Although there is an intelligible difference between Clarissa and
Jenny's cases, many commentators would argue that there is no
morally relevant difference. Clarissa and Jenny are equally
blameworthy, and therefore should be treated the same way by the
law. In fact, it is clear that at least some of what caused the early
academic commentators to see the distinction between culpable and
non-culpable impossible attempts in terms of the mistake of
law/mistake of fact distinction was not merely the belief that this was
the distinction the courts were making, but that it was the one the
courts should be making. When two parties have manifested their
willingness to violate a valid provision of criminal law, there seems to
be no reason to relieve one of liability for attempt because of the type
of mistake of fact he or she has made.
Commentators who subscribe to this conclusion offer a simple,
straightforward argument in its support. The purpose of the criminal
law is to punish those who manifest their dangerousness or moral
depravity through their actions. Those who try to violate the criminal
law, but fail to do so due to a mistaken belief about the nature of the
world have manifested their dangerousness and/or moral depravity,
regardless of whether their mistake was about a consequential or pure
circumstance. Therefore, all who make such mistakes should be
subject to criminal punishment.
This argument obviously entails the rejection of the common law
impossibility defense. A defendant whose attempt to commit a crime
is rendered impossible because of his or her mistake of fact about a
pure circumstance has nevertheless manifested his or her
dangerousness or depravity. Therefore, the fact that the attempt
could not result in a completed crime should not bar liability. It
remains true that when, due to a mistake of law, the defendant
attempts an imaginary crime, there can be no conviction for attempt.
But this is because the mens rea of attempt is not present, not because
the attempt cannot be completed.""
The argument thus provides a principled resolution to the initial
uncertainty we felt about Jenny's culpability:'t" she should be
convicted. It also resolves the courts' confusion about whether to
characterize the consequences the defendant intends to produce
objectively or in accordance with his or her erroneous belief. 5
Because the defendant's dangerousness or moral depravity is
103. See supra text accompanying note 27.
104. See supra pp. 11-12.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 76-77.
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manifested by what the defendant thinks he or she is doing, the
relevant consequences are those the defendant thinks he or she is
producing. Therefore, the defendant's actions should be described
according to the circumstances as he or she believes them to be.
Because of this last feature, commentators who adopt this line of
argument are usually known as subjectivists. 6 These commentators
answer the question of which actions can constitute the actus reus of
attempt very broadly, allowing any or almost any action the
defendant subjectively believes to be in furtherance of his or her
criminal intent to support a conviction."°7 Not all commentators agree
that this broad answer is the correct one. Those who would answer
the question more narrowly by requiring the defendant's actions to
possess particular, objectively identifiable characteristics are usually
referred to as objectivists.
106. See FLETCHER, supra note 26, at 166; Crocker, supra note 63, at 1057 ("On one
theory, or more accurately family of theories, society's license to punish the offender
derives from her dangerousness or wickedness .... Such theories are 'subjective."')
(footnote omitted).
107. Because it is based on the premise that the purpose of criminal law is to punish
those who manifest their dangerousness or moral depravity through their actions, the
subjectivist approach casts the actus reus requirement in a subsidiary role. Unlike
objectivist theories in which "the act of attempting should be taken as an independent
element of the crime of attempting," and "no liability should attach unless, first, the
defendant's conduct objectively conforms to criteria specified in advance," subjectivist
theories are "defined by the rejection of the claim that the act of attempting is a distinct
dimension of liability. For subjectivists, it is important that the actor take steps to execute
his criminal intent, yet no specifically defined act is required for liability." FLETCHER,
supra note 26, at 157. Thus, subjectivists are "interested in the defendant's conduct only in
so far as it reveals and confirms his mens rea." Jeremy Temkin, Impossible Attempts-
Another View, 39 MOD. L. REV. 55, 66 (1976).
108. See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 26:
We have referred several times to the distinguishing claim of objectivist theory
that the act of attempting should be taken as an independent element of the
crime of attempting....
The premise underlying objectivist theory is a general proposition about the
nature of legal liability, particularly criminal liability. The proposition is that no
liability should attach unless, first, the defendant's conduct objectively conforms
to criteria specified in advance; and secondly, that his mental state should bear
solely on his accountability for this act in violation of the law....
This is the point at which the critical feature of objectivist theory becomes clear.
Not any act will satisfy the requirement of conduct in violation of the law.
Id. at 157-58; Note, The Trend Away from Legal Impossibility as a Defense, 14 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 243, 251 (1978) ("Two schools of thought have developed with respect to
the crime of attempt and the defense of impossibility: the objectivist and the subjectivist.
Under the objectivist theory, it is the actus reus, the external manifestation of the actor's
criminal conduct, which injures society.").
As one commentator expressed the distinction between the objectivist and
subjectivist approach to attempt, "[plut rather crudely, the 'objectivists' would punish only
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The authors of the Model Penal Code explicitly adopted the
subjectivist approach to attempt in drafting the Code. Section 5.01
defines attempt as follows:
(1) Definition of Attempt. A person is guilty of an attempt to
commit a crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise
required for commission of the crime, he:
(a) purposely engages in conduct that would constitute the crime if
the attendant circumstances were as he believes them to be; or
(b) when causing a particular result is an element of the crime, does
or omits to do anything with the purpose of causing or with the
belief that it will cause such result without further conduct on his
part; or
(c) purposely does or omits to do anything that, under the
circumstances as he believes them to be, is an act or omission
constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to
culminate in his commission of the crime. '
As indicated by the emphasized phrases, the Code explicitly
incorporates the defendant's subjective characterization of his or her
actions into its description of the acts that will support a conviction
for attempt. Thus, under the Code, any action at all can serve as the
actus reus of an attempt as long as the defendant believes it will
further his or her criminal intention.
The definition reflects the Code's acceptance of the fundamental
proposition that the criminal sanction should be imposed on those
who manifest their dangerous or depraved propensities:
Conduct designed to cause or culminate in the commission of a
crime obviously yields an indication that the actor is disposed
towards such activity, not alone on this occasion but on others.
There is a need, therefore, subject again to proper safeguards, for a
legal basis upon which the special danger that such individuals
present may be assessed and dealt with. They must be made
amenable to the corrective process that the law provides." °
This causes the authors of the Code to explicitly reject an objectivist
approach to attempt:
The literature and the decisions dealing with the definition of a
criminal attempt reflect ambivalence as to how far the governing
criterion should focus on the dangerousness of the actor's conduct,
dangerous acts, while the 'subjectivists' would punish dangerous actors." Michael Cohen,
The Law Commission Report on Attempt and Impossibility in Relation to Attempt,
Conspiracy, and Incitement: (2) Questions of Impossibility, 1980 GRIM. L. REv. 773, 774.
109. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1) (1985) (emphasis added).
110. MODEL PENAL CODE art. 5, introduction at 294 (1985).
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measured by objective standards, and how far the dangerousness of
the actor, as a person manifesting a firm disposition to commit a
crime.... [T]he proper focus of attention is the actor's disposition.
The Model Code provisions are accordingly drafted with this in
mind.'
Accordingly, the Code would convict all those who, like Jenny, make
a mistake of fact about a pure circumstance:
The primary rationale of these decisions is that, judging the actor's
conduct in the light of the actual facts, what he intended to do did
not amount to a crime. This approach, however, is unsound in that
it seeks to evaluate a mental attitude-"intent" or "purpose"-not
by looking to the actor's mental frame of reference, but to a
situation wholly at variance with the actor's beliefs. In so doing,
the courts exonerate defendants in situations where attempt
liability most certainly should be imposed. In all of these cases the
actor's criminal purpose has been clearly demonstrated; he went as
far as he could in implementing that purpose; and, as a result, his
"dangerousness" is plainly manifested.
1 12
Thus, the Code is explicitly designed "to extend the criminality of
attempts by sweeping aside the defense of impossibility (including the
distinction between so-called factual and legal impossibility) . . .
111. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01, cmt. 1 at 298 (1985) (footnote omitted).
112. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01, cmt. 3(a) at 308-09 (1985) (footnote omitted).
113. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 10, at 295. Glanville Williams, one of the pre-
eminent advocates of the subjectivist approach, argued that the subjectivist conclusion
followed directly from the basic function of the actus reus, which is to demonstrate the
defendant's determination to effectuate his or her criminal intent. His explanation of the
actus reus requirement is:
That crime requires an act is invariably true if the proposition be read as
meaning that a private thought is not sufficient to found responsibility.... [The]
reasons for the rule would be (1) the difficulty of distinguishing between
daydream and fixed intention in the absence of behaviour tending towards the
crime intended, and (2) the undesirability of spreading the criminal law so wide
as to cover a mental state that the accused might be too irresolute even to begin
to translate into action.
Williams, supra note 20, at 1-2.
Applying this theory of the actus reus to the crime of attempt, Williams argued that there
is no need for a defendant's conduct to exhibit any particular characteristics to constitute
the actus reus of an attempt.
As a general rule, a crime is composed of actus reus and mens rea, and both
of these are necessary to constitute a crime. This interdependence of act and
mind means that neither alone can be strictly characterized as "criminal" or
"reus," notwithstanding the Latin phrases. Act and mind are literally reus only in
combination. However, in legal discussion it is convenient to use mens rea to
mean a state of mind that is criminal if there is the requisite act, and actus reus to
mean an act that is criminal if there is the requisite mind, whether or not the
other exists on the facts of the case. In this terminology, a surgeon who without
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Given the judicial confusion and frustration concerning the
common law defense of impossibility described in the Introduction
and Part II, the Model Penal Code's simple, logically coherent
argument for its rejection had sufficient appeal to carry the day. As
noted in the Introduction, impossibility is now almost never a valid
defense to a charge of attempt in the United States. With most states
adopting some version of the Model Penal Code's definition of
attempt, the subjectivist approach has become the orthodox position
intention (or even negligence) causes his patient to die on the operating table
commits the actus reus of murder, though he is not guilty of murder. He commits
an act that would, given the requisite intention, be murder.
An actus reus, then, need not be a crime apart from the state of mind. It
need not even be a tort, or a moral wrong, or a social mischief. Suppose that D
puts an aspirin in P's tea, thinking that it is the sweetening tablet for which P has
asked. This act is innocent; it harms no one; yet it is the actus reus of attempt to
murder. For if D intended to poison P, and believed that an aspirin would kill
him, his administration of it would be an attempt to murder.
Id. at 642 (footnote omitted).
This implies that although an act is required for there to be a conviction for attempt, this
requirement is satisfied by any act a defendant believes to be in furtherance of his or her
criminal ends. "[T]he question of whether there is an attempt may depend exclusively on
the mens rea. If there is a mens rea, it is capable of establishing as an actus reus an act that
would otherwise be not only legally but morally and socially innocent." Id. at 643.
Therefore, there are no particular, objectively identifiable features that a defendant's
conduct must possess to qualify as an actus reus of an attempt.
Williams's argument was persuasive enough to convince the English Law
Commissioners that England's law of attempt should be reformed on the subjectivist
model, which was done in the Criminal Attempts Act of 1981. See Criminal Attempts Act,
1981 § 1(2) (Eng.). Following Williams, the Law Commissioners argued that
[it] would be generally accepted that if a man possesses the appropriate mens rea
and commits acts which are sufficiently proximate to the actus reus of a criminal
offence, he is guilty of attempting to commit that offence. Where, with that
intention, he commits acts which, if the facts were as he believed them to be,
would have amounted to the actus reus of the full crime or would have been
sufficiently proximate to amount to an attempt, we cannot see why his failure to
appreciate the true facts should, in principle, relieve him of liability for the
attempt.
BRITISH LAW COMMISSION, REPORT NO. 102, CRIMINAL LAW: ATTEMPT, AND
IMPOSSIBILITY IN RELATION TO ATTEMPT, CONSPIRACY, AND INCITEMENT 5.1 (1980)
[hereinafter LAW COMMISSION REPORT].
The Commission found that defendants such as Jenny "are prepared to do all they can to
break the criminal law even though in the circumstances their attempts are doomed to
failure; and if they go unpunished, they may be encouraged to do better at the next
opportunity." Id. In accordance with the basic subjectivist assumption that the purpose of
criminal law is to punish those who have manifested their dangerous character, the
Commission concluded that "the fact that it is impossible to commit the crime aimed at
should not preclude a conviction for attempt." Id. at 53.
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on attempt. 114  But should it be? Is the Model Penal Code's
subjectivist argument sound?
The minority of commentators who favor a narrower
construction of the actus reus of attempt do not believe that it is.
These objectivist theorists have raised several objections to the Model
Penal Code's position, the most significant of which are that: 1) its
logic mandates the punishment of imaginary crimes, 2) its standard
for liability is impracticable, 3) it subjects the public to improper
preventative detention, 4) it permits punishment for thoughts alone,
5) it violates the principle of legality, 6) it improperly requires the
punishment of harmless, irrational attempts, and 7) it would allow
convictions to be based on unreliable forms of evidence. On close
examination, however, none of these objections seem to deal a fatal
blow to the Model Penal Code's subjectivist approach. The first five
appear to misconstrue the Code's position, while the last two, which
do accurately address the Code, fail to provide a principled normative
rationale for its rejection.
A. Imaginary Crimes
Neither the Code nor any other subjectivist theorist advocates
punishment for attempting imaginary crimes. However, objectivist
critics claim that the logic underlying the Code's definition suggests
that they should.' 15 One who attempts to commit an imaginary crime
is one who, laboring under a mistake of law, performs an action he or
she believes to be a crime, but which, in fact, is not. The only thing
that distinguishes such a case from any other impossible attempt is
that in imaginary crimes, the defendant has made a mistake of law
while in all other cases, the defendant has made a mistake of fact.
But whether one's mistake is of law or fact seems wholly immaterial
to the question of whether one has manifested his or her
dangerousness or depravity. In imaginary crimes, no less than in
ordinary impossible attempts, the defendant has shown himself or
herself willing to violate the law. In both cases, the defendant has
intentionally taken actions which, if things were as he or she believed
them to be, would constitute a crime. Such defendants appear
equally dangerous or depraved and equally likely, if left unpunished,
114. See supra text accompanying note 2. See also Crocker, supra note 63, at 1059
("Commentators are so nearly unanimous that the key to criminal liability ought to be the
dangerousness or depravity of the offender ... that this subjective theory is sometimes
simply called the 'modern' theory.").
115. FLETCHER, supra note 26, at 175-76.
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to try to violate the law in the future. As an illustration, consider
Laura and Frank, our anti-environmental activists. As one
commentator put it:
We fail to see how any rational system of criminal law could justify
convicting one and acquitting the other on so fragile and
unpersuasive a distinction that one was suffering under a mistake of
fact, and the other under a mistake of law. Certainly if the ultimate
test is the dangerousness of the actor (i.e., readiness to violate the
law), as [the subjectivist] would have it, no distinction is
warranted-[Laura] has indicated [her]self to be no less
"dangerous" than [Frank]."'
Thus, the objectivists would argue that it is difficult to see how an
acquittal in the case of imaginary crimes could be justified under the
Code's standard.
The problem with this objection is that it misconstrues the Code
and the subjectivist position generally. It is certainly true that
whether a defendant's mistake is about a matter of fact or law is
irrelevant to how dangerous or depraved he or she is. This is beside
the point, however, because the subjectivists are not advocating that
all dangerous or depraved people should be subject to criminal
punishment. They are proposing a standard for the actus reus of
attempt, not for attempt liability in toto. Subjectivists argue that
given a criminal mens rea, any action that demonstrates the
defendant's dangerousness or depravity can serve as an actus reus, not
that all dangerous or depraved people be punished for attempt.
The authors of the Code can freely admit that one who attempts
an imaginary crime is every bit as dangerous or depraved as one who
engages in a factually impossible attempt since each has equally
demonstrated his readiness to break the law. Laura is indeed as
dangerous as Frank. However, under the Code's approach, this
implies only that there is no difference between Laura and Frank with
regard to the actus reus of attempt. It does not imply that Laura and
Frank are equally culpable. The subjectivists can consistently
maintain that Laura is not liable for an attempt because she does not
possess the requisite mens rea. As previously noted,"7 one who
attempts an imaginary crime does not have the specific intent
required by the offense. Because such a defendant would not be
guilty of an attempt regardless of whether his or her action constitutes
an actus reus, the logic of the subjectivist approach does not require
116. KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 1, at 674 (footnote omitted).
117. See supra text accompanying note 27.
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convictions in cases of imaginary crimes. Laura and Frank may be
equally dangerous or depraved, but they have not equally met the
mens rea requirement for an attempt conviction.
B. Impracticability
Another objection brought against the Code's definition of
attempt is that it is fundamentally unworkable. Critics who advance
this objection point out that the Code's definition of attempt is based
on the assumption that the purpose of the law of attempt is the
protection of the public from dangerous or depraved individuals.
Realizing this end requires a standard of liability that will convict
those with socially dangerous or depraved characters, but acquit those
who pose no danger to society. The problem, according to the critics,
is that recent psychological and criminological developments have
shown that such a standard is unattainable because there is no
practicable way of differentiating dangerous from non-dangerous
individuals. This is evidenced by recent efforts to introduce effective
rehabilitation into the criminal punishment system which
demonstrated the futility of trying to determine the danger to society
presented by an individual:
The rehabilitative ideal, of which the concept of dangerousness is a
cornerstone, has recently undergone a rather painful process of
demystification....
The most comprehensive study so far on the effectiveness of
rehabilitation programs has led its authors to the devastating
judgment that "nothing works." ... [T]he very foundations of the
belief in our ability to identify and cure socially dangerous
individuals have now been shattered. 18
Because the subjectivist approach to attempt requires precisely this
judgment, it must be rejected as unworkable:
As a consequence of the decay of the rehabilitative ideal, a
reorientation of the basic assumptions of attempt law seems
necessary. The fairly modern idea that a psychiatrist should
determine the attemptor's guilt by diagnosing the amount of
subconscious internal control which helped to foil the attempt and
thus indicated lesser dangerousness, appears as rather grotesque
today. Nevertheless, it is but a logical endpoint of the "rational
course" proposed by Professor Glanville Williams, which is to
"catch intending offenders as soon as possible, and set about curing
them of their evil tendencies."
118. Weigend, supra note 28, at 261-62 (footnotes omitted).
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That course seems much less "rational" today as we know
more about our ignorance. 9
Much like the last objection, the charge of impracticability
appears to be an attack on a straw man. There may indeed be no
practicable method for identifying who possesses a dangerous or
depraved character in the sense of being likely to violate the law in
the future. However, the subjectivist definition of attempt requires
no such determination. It does not require the prediction of future
criminal acts. It advocates the punishment of dangerous or depraved
people only in the sense that those who have already taken actions
that demonstrate their willingness to break the law should be
punished. The subjectivist position asserts that, given the mens rea of
attempt, one who has taken any past action that demonstrates his or
her willingness to violate the law should be convicted of attempt. Our
inability to predict who will violate the law in the future clearly has no
bearing on the adequacy of this claim.
C. Preventative Detention
Some objectivist theorists charge that the Model Penal Code's
definition of attempt converts the law of attempt into a mechanism
for improper preventative detention. Because the chief concern of
the Code is to protect the public from dangerous or depraved
individuals, its definition of attempt allows the punishment of those
who, like Jean-Claude, Frank, Clarissa, and Jenny, have engaged in
entirely harmless conduct on the ground that they may do harm in the
future. As Glanville Williams, a pre-eminent subjectivist theorist,
explains with regard to cases like Clarissa's and Jenny's:
Getting away from dialectics, it is said in favor of the narrower
construction of the law that one who attempts to murder with
sugar, thinking it to be arsenic, ought not to be held guilty of an
attempt because "there is no danger to the public." The short
answer to this is that there is danger to the public in leaving
uncorrected a man who is bent on murder.
20
Th[e] attempted receiver [of unstolen property] should be liable to
punishment for the same reason as other attempters are: that he
has shown himself prone to crime and may well do it again if he
does not receive an effective warning."'
119. Id. at 262 (quoting WILLIAMS, supra note 20, at 632) (Uootnotes omitted).
120. WILLIAMS, supra note 20, at 645 (footnotes omitted).
121. Glanville Williams, Attempting the Impossible-A Reply, 22 CRIM. L.Q. 49, 55
(1979). This is also the position taken by the Model Penal Code. See infra text
accompanying note 136.
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Objectivist critics claim that this runs afoul of the fundamental tenet
of criminal jurisprudence that holds that one can be punished only for
what one does, not for what one may do in the future. The essential
purpose of the actus reus requirement is to bar preventative detention
by limiting the state to proceeding against those who have already
engaged in conduct that has been expressly prohibited, rather than
those who merely plan to do so in the future. The critics accuse the
Code of defeating this purpose by interpreting the actus reus of
attempt to allow for the punishment of those who have, in fact, done
no harm merely because they may do so in the future.
This is the price of the choice made long ago in favour of
guaranteeing that the innocent be protected, that the heavy weight
of the criminal sanction be not imposed too broadly and that the
process work moderately rather than oppressively. The
[subjectivist approach], however, seem[s] unconcerned about all
this. It would make of the law of attempt a full-scale method of
preventive detention."'
As was the case with the previous two objections, this objection
misconstrues the subjectivist position on attempt, in this case by
confusing the concept of harm with the concept of action.
Preventative detention consists of the incarceration of an individual
who has not yet taken wrongful or harmful action to prevent such
action in the future. The Code's definition of attempt does not allow
for the detention of one who has not yet acted; it allows for the
detention of one who has acted in furtherance of a criminal intention
even though that action produces no harm. The subjectivist position
is indeed justified on the basis of the need to prevent those who have
demonstrated their dangerousness or depravity from causing harm in
the future. But this does not imply that the defendant is being
incarcerated for actions he or she has not yet and only might take.
The defendant is being incarcerated for actions he or she has already
taken because those actions demonstrate that he or she is a dangerous
or depraved person. This is not preventative detention, but perfectly
appropriate punishment for past actions.
D. Punishment for Thoughts Alone
A related objection frequently brought against the Code's
subjectivist position is that it permits punishment for thoughts alone.
Objectivist critics claim that the Code's approach does not merely
place the actus reus requirement in a subsidiary role as the
122. Temkin, supra note 107, at 66.
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subjectivists admit,'23 but renders it entirely devoid of content, and
thus is equivalent to punishing defendants for their thoughts alone.
2 4
Although the subjectivists claim to be retaining the actus reus
element, they regard this element as fulfilled by any action
whatsoever as long as the accused believes it will result in a crime.
But, the critics assert, being subject to conviction for doing anything
with the belief that it will result in a crime is functionally
indistinguishable from being liable to conviction for merely resolving
to commit a crime:
[The subjectivist] is inviting us to say that attempted murder can be
doing anything while thinking (mistakenly) that you are going to
cause [the death of a human being]. This is a dangerous invitation
which should be rejected, since it provides no criterion whatsoever
for characterizing an act as an attempt other than the mistaken
view under which it is being done, and is thus, in spite of [the
subjectivist's] denials, tantamount to punishment for intention
alone.2'
This objection can also be illustrated with Clarissa's case.
Because Clarissa's act of stirring sugar into her husband's coffee is
completely innocent, the only factor that will distinguish her case
from non-criminal activity is Clarissa's belief that the sugar is arsenic.
If, however, the only factor that distinguishes the culpable from the
non-culpable is Clarissa's belief, then the actus reus requirement
apparently affords her no substantive protection from conviction.
She is being punished exclusively for what is in her mind.
In this case, the authors of the Code can reasonably respond that
this objection is wrong on its face. The Code's definition of attempt
punishes not mere intention, but only proscribed intentions that have
been acted upon.
Superficially it may seem as though.., the use of the law of
attempt would result in punishing a man for mens rea alone, in
defiance of the principle that the criminal law requires an act or
omission. But it is hoped that this objection has already been
sufficiently answered: the accused has gone far beyond mental
preparation for a crime; he has adopted a course of conduct which,
123. See supra note 107.
124. See Note, supra note 108, at 251-52 ("Subjectivism, on the other hand, virtually
eliminates any consideration of the actus reus and instead imposes criminal liability for a
criminal mens rea.") (footnote omitted).
125. Hughes, supra note 4, at 1026.
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on the facts as he believes them to be, constitute not merely an
attempt but the consummated crime.126
The subjectivists can fairly claim that there is a substantive, practical
difference between punishing one who intends to commit a crime but
takes no action and punishing one who intends to commit a crime and
acts upon his intention, albeit mistakenly. Thus, the Code's approach
to attempt is not functionally equivalent to punishing for thoughts
alone. The requirement of action obviously provides more of a
limitation on liability than its absence.
The only sense in which the Code's approach is indistinguishable
from punishment for intention alone is to outward appearance; there
may be no apparent difference between punishing one who intends to
commit a crime but takes no action in furtherance of this intent and
punishing one who intends to commit a crime, acts upon his intent,
but due to a mistake, acts in a perfectly innocent way. However,
punishing an innocent-appearing action taken with a criminal intent is
far from a novel event. Driving one's car across a state line is a
perfectly innocent action, but if done with the intent to avoid
prosecution, it is a crime. This does not imply that the prohibition
on flight from prosecution constitutes punishment for thoughts alone.
The subjectivists appear to be able to distinguish their position
from punishment for thoughts alone on a principled basis. Because
the criminal law is designed to protect the public from dangerous
people, and because taking action in furtherance of a criminal intent
is sufficient to demonstrate a defendant's dangerousness or depravity,
it is proper to punish such a defendant even if his or her actions
appear innocent. However, because one who merely forms a criminal
intent but does nothing to effectuate it has demonstrated neither
dangerousness nor depravity, he or she should not be punished.
Thus, there should be no punishment for thoughts alone.
126. WILLIAMS, supra note 20, at 649-50. See also LAW COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 113, at 49:
It would not mean that a man would be liable for an attempt by reason of his
intent alone. An attempt would still require a proximate act as well as an intent
although the proximity of the act would have to be judged in the light of the facts
as the defendant believed them to be.
127. 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1970) (flight to avoid prosecution or giving testimony). Recall
that Glanville Williams pointed out that "if there is a mens rea, it is capable of establishing
as an actus reus an act that would otherwise be not only legally but morally and socially
innocent. Consequently, it is false to say that, because an act is 'objectively' innocent it
cannot be a criminal attempt." WILLIAMS, supra note 20, at 575. See also supra note 113.
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E. Legality
An objection that is often brought against the Code's approach is
that its definition of attempt violates the principle of legality. The
principle of legality holds that "there must be no crime or punishment
except in accordance with fixed, predetermined law": 28
Legality requires that the forbidden conduct be defined in advance.
This is in part so that the citizen will receive advance guidance as to
what conduct is forbidden. But it is well recognized that the
requirement of advance definition also serves to control the
discretion, and thereby minimize the bias, of those officers of the
criminal process who make decisions affecting the defendant. 29
Objectivists claim that because the subjectivist definition of attempt is
essentially "doing anything with the intention of committing a crime,"
under it, the law of attempt is neither fixed nor predetermined. This
definition not only fails to provide the public with advance warning of
what conduct is prohibited, it leaves prosecutorial and judicial
officials with virtually unlimited discretion to determine what conduct
contravenes the law." To realize the end of subjecting all those who
demonstrate their dangerousness or depravity to the criminal
sanction, the Code's definition of attempt must be extremely flexible:
But, of course, this flexibility is bought at the cost of legality and
notice. The simple truth is that when any version of the subjective
theory holds sway, a potential offender can have no confidence as
to how much conduct towards the commission of a crime will be
sufficient to constitute an attempt-unless there happens to be a
case directly on point.'
As with the last objection, the authors of the Code can make a
reasonable case that this objection is simply wrong. The Code's
definition of attempt entails no lack of advanced warning of what
conduct is subject to punishment. The substantive crimes the
defendants are trying to commit are all clearly defined and the law of
attempt informs the public that doing anything in the effort to commit
128. WILLIAMS, supra note 20, at 575.
129. Enker, supra note 58, at 670.
130. See Ryu, supra note 28:
In modern times the idea developed that there can be no crime without a clear
actus reus. The legality principle (nulla poena sine lege) is based upon that idea.
Subjectivism in the law of attempt constitutes a threat to this principle. For this
reason we cannot accept subjectivism, just as we cannot abdicate the legality
principle in the interpretation of statutes, as did the National Socialists and
Soviet Russia.
Id. at 1188-89.
131. Crocker, supra note 63, at 1093.
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them is prohibited. This may be a broad definition of the range of
attempt liability, but it is perfectly clear and definite. The public is
not left in doubt as to which actions intended to result in a crime
constitute attempts and which do not; all do. This is perfectly
adequate advanced warning of what conduct is subject to punishment.
It certainly does not invest prosecutorial agents and judges with
discretion to redefine the nature of the offense or to do the type of
"criminal equity" that is prohibited by the principle of legality.'
Though broad, the Code's definition of attempt is entirely fixed.'
F. Irrational Attempts
A common objection raised against the Model Penal Code's
approach to attempt implicates our hypothetical friend Jean-Claude,
who was convicted of attempted murder for driving a needle through
the heart of a voodoo image of his enemy. Under the Code's
subjectivist approach, it would appear that Jean-Claude was rightly
convicted. He certainly had the mens rea required for attempted
murder, and if the circumstances were as he believed them to be, he
would not only have taken a substantial step toward producing his
enemy's death, he would have done everything required to bring it
about. Thus, under the Code, his actions constitute the actus reus of
attempted murder. They certainly demonstrate that he has the
dangerous or depraved disposition to commit murder. Therefore,
Jean-Claude's culpability appears clear cut.
Objectivist critics of the Code contend that this result is simply
wrong. They argue that Jean-Claude's actions were patently
harmless, and that any standard of liability that imposes criminal
132. See WILLIAMS, supra note 20:
Observe that the principle is not satisfied merely by the fact that the punishment
inflicted is technically legal. The Star Chamber was a legal tribunal, but it did not
exemplify the rule of law in Dicey's philosophy. "Law" for this purpose means a
body of fixed rules; and it excludes wide discretion even though that discretion be
exercised by independent judges. The principle of legality involves rejecting
"criminal equity" as a mode of extending the law.
Id. at 576.
133. This point has been recognized by Thomas Weigend, a prominent objectivist
theorist, who concedes:
The demands of the principle of legality, which calls for a formal statement
of the limits between permissible and criminal conduct, could be satisfied by a
general statutory provision excluding the defense of legal impossibility. To read
into nulla poena sine lege the requirement of a particular amount of actus reus
and mens rea in each definition of an offense would be an illicit extension of that
basically formal principle.
Weigend, supra note 28, at 245.
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sanctions on someone like Jean-Claude is clearly too broad. George
Fletcher, a leading objectivist theorist, points out that Jean-Claude's
situation represents:
[O]ne case in which virtually everyone agrees that there should be
no liability ... [i.e.,] the case of nominal efforts to inflict harm by
superstitious means, say by black magic or witchcraft. The
consensus of Western legal systems is that there should be no
liability, regardless of the wickedness of intent, for sticking pins in a
doll or chanting an incantation to banish one's enemy to the nether
world. "
Thus, objectivist theorists offer Jean-Claude's conviction as a
counter-example to the Code's subjectivist approach to attempts.'
This objection is likely to be persuasive only to those who
already share the intuitions of the critics who make it. Subjectivist
theorists can with some justice claim that the objectivists' assertion
constitutes mere disagreement rather than a principled objection.
Because there are almost no reported cases of irrational attempts, the
consensus Fletcher refers to is merely agreement among
134. FLETCHER, supra note 26, at 166.
135. See, e.g., Weigend, supra note 28, at 260 (footnote omitted):
Under the dangerousness rationale, there is no convincing reason why we should
not impose punishment on the Haitian voodoo doctor of hypothetical fame who
sets out to kill persons by means of incantation and witchcraft. He has clearly
shown his dangerous propensities and may well use more effective means the
next time. While only few proponents of the subjective theory would be ready to
carry the principle that far, the majority has great difficulties distinguishing these
cases of "unreal" attempts from other situations in which the actor's efforts are
destined to fail and yet demonstrate his dangerousness.
See also Ian Dennis, The Law Commission Report on Attempt and Impossibility in
Relation to Attempt, Conspiracy and Incitement. (1) The Elements of Attempt, 1980 CRIM.
L. REv. 758:
However, the subjectivist approach to attempts has always been open to certain
objections. It produces absurd results in extreme cases. Glanville Williams gives
the example of a D who believes that the person he wishes to kill has changed
into the form of a white cat. If he then shoots at a white cat which he believes to
be the victim, the theory ought to require a conviction for attempted murder of
the supposed victim. Williams claims that such a conclusion could be scouted,
but it is difficult to see the limitation in the subjectivist argument which permits a
statement that this conduct is not criminal. Why should D not be deterred from
trying again at his victim, when he might not be suffering from his
anthropomorphic delusion?
See also FLETCHER, supra note 26, at 175:
Yet within the framework of the subjective standard that the facts should be
taken as the actor perceives them to be, it is by no means easy to explain why
superstitious attempts ... should be exempt from punishment. According to the
actor's view of the world, his use of black magic is likely to produce the desired
effect, and therefore he should be held accountable.
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commentators who apparently do not accept the subjectivist
approach. It is true that Jean-Claude's actions are harmless.
However, this is relevant only if one has already discounted the
subjectivist approach to attempt for which the salient feature is not
the harmfulness of Jean-Claude's actions per se, but whether they
demonstrate his dangerousness. One who has made every effort to
kill by irrationally ineffective means may well employ more
efficacious means the next time. Had Jean-Claude not been arrested,
he may well have tried again with a machete.
Viewed in isolation, punishing Jean-Claude for attempted
murder may seem to be a harsh result. But the authors of the Code
would argue that such cases should not be viewed in isolation. Jean-
Claude's attempt may have been irrational in that it employed means
that a reasonable person would know could not accomplish his
objective, but it demonstrated his willingness to take another's life
and hence his dangerousness. Since, according to the Code, the
purpose of punishing attempts is to subject those who pose a danger
to their fellow citizens to criminal sanction, Jean-Claude is a proper
candidate for punishment:
Cases can be imagined in which it might well be accurate to say that
the nature of the means selected, say black magic, substantially
negates dangerousness of character. On the other hand, there are
many cases as well where one who tries to commit a crime by what
he later learns to be inadequate methods will recognize the futility
of his course of action and seek more efficacious means. There are,
in other words, many instances of dangerous character revealed by
"impossible" attempts, and to develop a theory around highly
exceptional situations ignores the propriety of convictions in
these.136
Thus, subjectivists can fairly contend that a shared intuition among
non-subjectivist theorists that people like Jean-Claude should not be
136. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01, cmt. 3(b) at 316, n.88 (1985). In addition, it should
be noted that the authors of the Code created section 5.05, which allows the court to
dismiss a prosecution in the former type of case in which the irrationality of the
defendant's conduct negates his or her dangerousness. See MODEL PENAL CODE:
If the particular conduct charged to constitute a criminal attempt, solicitation or
conspiracy is so inherently unlikely to result or culminate in the commission of a
crime that neither such conduct nor the actor presents a public danger warranting
the grading of such offense under this Section, the Court shall exercise its power
under Section 6.12 to enter judgment and impose sentence for a crime of lower
grade or degree or, in extreme cases, may dismiss the prosecution.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05(2) (1985).
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subject to punishment does not constitute an adequate reason for
rejecting the Code's definition of attempt.
G. Unreliable Evidence
Finally, objectivist critics charge that the Code's subjectivist
approach to attempt endangers the innocent by allowing convictions
to be based on unreliable forms of evidence. These critics point out
that to gain a conviction in criminal cases, the prosecution must
establish both that the defendant's conduct conformed to an
antecedently defined standard and that he or she possessed the
requisite state of mind when engaging in such conduct. This means
that in addition to evidence of the defendant's state of mind, the
prosecution must produce specific evidence demonstrating that the
defendant's conduct constituted the actus reus of the relevant offense.
However, under the Code's definition, the defendant's conduct need
not meet any particular set of criteria. Any action that the defendant
believes will result in a crime will suffice when undertaken with the
appropriate mens rea. This means that, under the Code, a conviction
can be obtained based solely upon evidence of what was in the
defendant's mind. The evidence that is usually required to establish
what the defendant has done is replaced by evidence of what the
defendant believed he or she has done.
The problem, according to objectivist theorists, is that evidence
of a defendant's state of mind in the absence of any objectively
verifiable supporting facts is notoriously unreliable. Arnold Enker
points out that in cases like Jenny's, for example, there is:
a significant statistical correlation between possession of recently
stolen goods and knowledge of the fact that they have been stolen.
If we can say that in a given percentage of the cases the possessor
knows the good [sic] are stolen, then possession of stolen goods is
probative of knowledge that the good [sic] are stolen at least in the
sense that proof of possession of such goods makes it more likely
that the defendant knew the goods were stolen than if there is no
proof of possession.... [However,] whatever the statistical relation
between possession and knowledge may be, the percentage of
persons possessing unstolen goods who believe the goods are stolen
is clearly much lower.'37
As a result, one can be convicted of an attempt on highly suspect
evidence:
137. Enker, supra note 58, at 680-81 (footnote omitted).
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The point is... that by eliminating these objective elements we
create newly defined crimes in which we replace the statutorily
defined fixed reference points for judging the defendant's mens rea
with an open-ended sufficiency-of-the-evidence test which may
include the less reliable forms of evidence such as questionable
admissions, the testimony of informers and accomplices, and proof
of prior convictions."
Consider Clarissa's case again. She stirred sugar into her
husband's coffee just as she did every morning. It was only because
she went to the police to confess that she was arrested. But, as
Graham Hughes points out, "apart from [her] confession, there is
nothing at all that approaches the threshold of criminal behavior." '39
In such cases, "the danger of the [subjectivist] view is that under it
cases appear as indictable attempts in situations where proof of the
intention of the accused is the only circumstance that could make us
begin to think of what has been done as a criminal attempt.
1 40
This is a potentially serious objection to the Code's subjectivist
position. If the subjectivist theory of attempt really does create an
unacceptable risk of convicting the innocent, that would seem to be a
good reason for its rejection. However, the supporters of the Code's
definition respond to this charge by denying that the subjectivist
position creates any greater danger of convicting the innocent than
that of many substantive crimes that permit conviction on the basis of
conduct that is innocent on its face:
A considerable number of instances can be named in which the
offender's act, viewed by itself, is harmless, but is nevertheless
punishable if a particular accompanying state of mind on his part
can be proved.... It is generally unobjectionable, and often highly
desirable, to enter into a room [breaking and entering or entering],
to make a telephone call [disorderly conduct], to stand upon the
sidewalk [loitering with intent to disturb school], to pay money to a
party in a lawsuit [communicating with jurors and witnesses], to
travel [flight to avoid prosecution or giving testimony] or to
transport a woman across state borders [White Slave traffic]. Yet
all these activities are punishable if done with the "proper" criminal
intent. The law of criminal omissions is another concededly
atypical example-if there exists a legal duty to act, the offender
may be peacefully asleep and yet thereby incur criminal liability.
141
138. Id. at 682.
139. Hughes, supra note 4, at 1024.
140. Id.
141. Weigend, supra note 28, at 245-46 (footnote omitted). See also Glanville
Williams's account of the purpose of the actus reus requirement, supra note 113.
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If innocent acts can serve as the actus reus of substantive crimes
without posing an unacceptable risk that the innocent will be
convicted, subjectivist theorists can reasonably ask why that risk is
unacceptable when the crime is attempt.
The force of the objectivist criticism comes from the implication
that the subjectivist approach to attempts presents a greater risk of
convicting the innocent than does the theory underlying the
substantive crimes. The subjectivist response appears to show that
this is not the case. Every crime poses some risk that innocent people
will be convicted. How much is unacceptable? Subjectivist theorists
can argue that the proper amount of this risk is the minimum
necessary to accomplish the goal of the criminal law, which, according
to them, is to protect the public from dangerous or depraved
individuals. This is precisely the amount of risk their approach to
attempts presents. Unless the objectivists can provide a principled
reason why this level of risk is unacceptable, it does not appear that
the present objection can effectively undermine the subjectivist
position.
H. Summary
This review of the complaints that objectivist theorists typically
bring against the Code's definition of attempt shows that most are
ineffective. Several, such as the claims that the logic of the Code's
definition requires the punishment of imaginary crimes, that the
Code's definition permits preventative detention, and that the Code's
standard of attempt liability is impracticable, turn out to be attacks on
a straw man. Each of these criticize the proposition that the law of
attempt should be defined to permit the punishment of anyone with a
dangerous or depraved character. But this is much broader than the
Code's position, which is that given the mens rea of attempt, any act
in furtherance of that mens rea can serve as the actus reus of an
attempt. This more modest proposition does not fall victim to these
objections. In addition, the claims that the Code's definition would
allow punishment for thoughts alone and violates the principle of
legality appear to be inaccurate exaggerations.
The remaining objections-that the Code would punish
irrational attempts and allow convictions based on unreliable forms of
evidence-amount to a charge that the Code's definition of attempt
is too broad. These objections accurately point out that the Code
would punish those who employ irrational means to accomplish their
criminal ends and those whose actions are outwardly
indistinguishable from innocent activity. However, they do not
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present a compelling case that punishing irrational or innocent-
appearing attempts is normatively unacceptable. Moreover, the
authors of the Code have provided a principled argument for the
conclusion that it is not. If the criminal law is designed to protect the
public from dangerous or depraved individuals and punishing
irrational and innocent-appearing attempts will help realize this end,
then punishing these attempts is normatively justified. Jean-Claude
may have acted in a harmlessly ineffectual manner and Frank's,
Clarissa's, and Jenny's conduct may appear outwardly innocent, but
each is just as morally blameworthy as the pickpocket who reaches
into an empty pocket or the jealous lover who fires a pistol at his rival
but misses. Why should they escape punishment when the pickpocket
and lover do not? Indeed, Glanville Williams poses precisely this
question as a challenge to all those who advocate an objectivist
approach to attempt: "The burden lies on those who would restrict
the law of attempt to show 1) that there is a reason of policy for so
restricting it and 2) that a line between punishable and non-
punishable impossible attempts can be satisfactorily drawn.', 142 Can
this challenge be met?
IV. The Distinction Between Moral and
Criminal Responsibility
I believe that Professor Williams's challenge can be met. In
subsequent Parts of this Article, I will both identify the "reason of
policy" that justifies narrowing the Model Penal Code's definition of
attempt and show that there is a practicable method for identifying
the cases in which impossibility should serve as a defense to a charge
of attempt. But to do so, I must begin by highlighting a fundamental
flaw in the normative arguments offered in support of the Code's
definition: the improper conflation of moral and criminal
responsibility.
In the preceding section, we saw that the basic argument for the
Model Penal Code's definition of attempt rested on the premise that
the criminal law is designed to punish those who manifest their
dangerousness or moral depravity through their actions.' 3 This is
merely a reflection of what the subjectivists regard as the underlying
reason for having a criminal justice system in the first place, which is
to provide for an orderly society and secure the persons and property
142. Williams, supra note 121, at 55.
143. See supra p. 26.
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of law-abiding citizens against invasion by their ill-motivated (or
negligent) fellows. Punishing those who act in furtherance of a
criminal intention, even if their efforts are extremely inept and cannot
possibly succeed, advances this purpose by preventing these
individuals from trying again by more effective means. Therefore, the
subjectivists argue that the Model Penal Code's definition allowing
any action in furtherance of a criminal intention to serve as the actus
reus of an attempt advances the fundamental purpose of the criminal
law.
The subjectivists' basic argument is typically supplemented with
two other normative arguments: 1) that the Code's definition is
derived from an analysis of the underlying purposes of punishment;
and 2) that it is required by the fundamental principle of justice that
requires treating like cases alike. The former argument recognizes
that there is much controversy over what constitutes the proper
purpose of criminal punishment. Debate rages over the relative
importance of deterrence, retribution, and rehabilitation and how to
reconcile conflicts among these ends. This is immaterial to the
subjectivist argument, however, which contends that all of the
putative purposes of punishment support the Model Penal Code's
standard for attempt liability. For example, if the proper purpose of
punishment is deterrence, punishing those who intend to violate the
law and fail is fully justified regardless of the reason for the failure.
Doing so certainly provides specific deterrence by preventing the
particular defendant from trying again. It also provides general
deterrence by discouraging both those who
are not completely confident that they will succeed in their criminal
objective, but will be prepared to run the risk of punishment if they
can be assured that they have to pay nothing for attempts which
fail; whereas if unsuccessful attempts were also punished the price
might appear to them to be too high...
and those who "might with good or bad reason believe that if they
succeed in committing some crime they will escape, but if they fail
they may be caught."'' 5 Those who demonstrate their willingness to
violate the law by acting in furtherance of a criminal intent are
precisely the individuals who need deterring. The particular reason
why such attempts fail seems wholly irrelevant to the deterrent value
of punishing the attempt. Further, if the purpose of punishment is
either retribution or rehabilitation, the case is even clearer. For the
144. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 129 (1968).
145. Id.
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retr'butivist, punishment must be assigned in proportion to the moral
desserts of the defendant. But one who has done all he or she can to
violate the law but failed is just as morally culpable as one who
succeeds, and thus just as deserving of punishment.146 Once again, the
reason why the attempt failed is irrelevant to the defendant's moral
blameworthiness, and thus to his or her liability to punishment.
Similarly, anyone who demonstrates his or her willingness to violate
the law is in need of rehabilitation regardless of whether his or her
efforts were successful. Jean-Claude, Frank, Clarissa, and Jenny are
all just as morally culpable and just as in need of deterrence or
rehabilitation as anyone else who attempts to commit a crime, and
hence just as deserving of punishment. Thus, the subjectivists
contend that regardless of which theory of punishment is correct, the
Model Penal Code supplies the proper definition of attempt.
47
The subjectivists also argue for the Model Penal Code's
definition of attempt indirectly by contending that all objectivist
definitions violate the basic principle of justice that requires that like
cases be treated alike. This is because no matter where the objectivist
theorists draw the line between culpable and non-culpable attempts,
parties who are identical in all morally relevant respects will end up
on opposite sides of it. This point was made by the British Law
Commission which argued:
146. See id. at 128 ("On a retributive view perhaps the answer is easy. The criminal had
gone so far as to do his best to execute a wicked intention .... "). Professor Crocker
claims that his objectivist imposition theory is based on the requirements of "retributive
justice," see Crocker, supra note 63, at 1095-96, by which he means a notion of reciprocity
in which punishment is assigned in proportion to the amount of harm done. However, this
seems to confuse tort and criminal law. Crocker's retributive justice sounds more like the
concept of corrective justice that grounds liability in tort than a theory of criminal
punishment, something that was noted by H.L.A. Hart who pointed out that:
[T]he simple theory that it is a perfectly legitimate ground to grade punishments
according to the amount of harm actually done.., seems to confuse punishment
with compensation, the amount of which should indeed be fixed in relation to
harm done. Even if punishment and compensation were not distinguished in
primitive law, many think that this is no excuse for confusing them now. Why
should the accidental fact that an intended harmful outcome has not occurred be
a ground for punishing less a criminal who may be equally dangerous and equally
wicked?
HART, supra note 144, at 130-31.
147. Indeed, even the objectivist theorist J.C. Smith concedes that:
It may be said that from the point of view of the moral culpability of the actor,
there is no difference between the two types of case; and this is true. It may also
be said that if the object of the law is to deter, there is no valid ground for
distinguishing between them. This is equally true.
Smith, supra, note 94 at 217.
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[O]ne may contrast the case of the intending murderer who doses
his victim with too weak a solution of poison with that of another
who administers an entirely innocent liquid. Both believe that what
they are giving is lethal. The only possible explanation which can
be given for holding the former guilty of attempted murder and the
latter not guilty is that the actions of the former were in some sense
more dangerous than those of the latter. The explanation itself
poses the question of how weak the mixture has to be before it
becomes innocent.
Results as capricious as these do not seem acceptable in the
criminal law.'
Further, the objectivist approach to attempt by definition
distinguishes culpable from non-culpable attempts on the basis of
something other than the moral characteristics of the defendant. This
seems to guarantee that "it would have an arbitrary operation,
149
often "acquitting persons who may be even more dangerous to the
public than those who are convicted."'"5 As Professor Michael Cohen
put it:
What is being submitted is that the "objectivists" are being seduced
by the relative harmlessness of the extreme examples. They would
throw away a device that would enable conviction in those
analytically indistinguishable cases where, on any view, D is a social
danger. The price for not convicting the relatively harmless would
be that the criminal law would be impotent to deal with the wicked
and the dangerous.5
It must be admitted that these arguments for the Model Penal
Code's definition of attempt are impeccable under the assumption that
there is no difference in principle between moral and criminal
responsibility. One is morally responsible and hence subject to moral
censure when one acts immorally, i.e., when one intentionally or at
least negligently violates a moral tenet or fails to fulfill a moral
obligation.152 The subjectivist arguments proceed as though the class
of actions for which one may be held criminally responsible and
148. LAW COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 113, at 50.
149. Glanville Williams, Criminal Attempts-A Reply, 1962 CRIM. L. REV. 300, 307.
150. Id.
151. Cohen, supra note 108, at 775. Indeed, even objectivist theorists such as Professor
Jeremy Temkin admit that "[sitrange results are likely to flow from such a
distinction .... Temkin, supra note 107, at 57. See also Elkind, supra note 58, at 23
("[T]he result does not always conform to our notions of what is blameworthy conduct,
and some, such as Jaffe, go unpunished despite a clear intent to violate substantive law.").
152. Technically, one is morally responsible whenever one's actions are worthy of
either moral blame or moral praise. The present discussion is restricted exclusively to
blameworthy actions which are the only relevant analog for criminal responsibility.
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hence subject to criminal punishment is simply a subset of the class of
actions for which one may be held morally responsible; the subset
that has been deemed worthy of enforcement by state sanction.
Under this view, criminal responsibility may be properly imposed
when one has engaged in morally culpable action of the type that the
criminal law is designed to suppress. If, indeed, the purpose of the
criminal law is to secure the persons and property of citizens against
harm from their fellows, as the subjectivists contend, this would mean
that criminal responsibility may be imposed whenever a defendant
acts in a morally culpable way that demonstrates that the defendant
poses the danger of harm to his or her fellow citizens. This
conception of criminal responsibility leads directly to the Model
Penal Code's subjectivist position on attempt because, given action on
the part of the defendant that demonstrates he or she is a danger to
others, the determining factor as to whether the defendant should be
subjected to criminal punishment must be his or her moral culpability.
The problem with this line of reasoning is that the assumption
upon which it is based is incorrect. There is a principled difference
between moral and criminal responsibility. Moral responsibility
indicates that one is deserving of punishment. Criminal responsibility
authorizes some human beings to punish others. Criminal
responsibility inherently involves an element of human agency that
moral responsibility does not.
In making a determination of moral responsibility, we are
concerned only with the actions of one party, the agent whose
conduct is being evaluated. The only relevant issue is whether the
agent has acted in a morally unacceptable way; whether he or she has
violated a moral tenet or failed to fulfill a moral obligation.53
Determining that the agent has acted in a morally blameworthy
manner does not in itself authorize anyone else to take action against
him or her. The inquiry is an abstract one involving no practical
enforcement issues.
The case is different when we make a determination of criminal
responsibility. Such a determination requires not only a finding that
the defendant has acted in a culpable manner that manifests his or her
dangerousness or depravity, but also that it is proper for agents of the
153. I am, of course, not suggesting that determining moral responsibility is a simple
matter. There is little current agreement on what constitutes the proper set of moral
tenets, or for that matter whether there are any valid moral tenets at all. I am suggesting
only that under the assumption that we know what moral tenets should be applied, the
determination of an agent's moral responsibility requires no considerations other than
whether his or her conduct violates the relevant tenets.
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government to impose a criminal sanction on him or her. Here, we
are necessarily concerned with the actions of two parties, the
defendant and the government enforcement agents. Unless these
agents are both omniscient and incorruptible, the class of cases in
which the defendant has culpably manifested his or her
dangerousness or depravity cannot be coextensive with the class of
cases in which the imposition of the criminal sanction is justified.
There will always be some cases in which the effort to impose
punishment on a class of defendants who morally deserve it would
subject the public to an unacceptable risk of harm from the errors or
venality of the human beings charged with enforcing the law. If the
criminal justice system were guaranteed to be administered with
godlike perfection, then realms of criminal responsibility and moral
responsibility would indeed be co-extensive. But this is not the world
in which we live. Thus determinations of criminal responsibility must
always consider practical matters of administration that
determinations of moral responsibility ignore.
In asserting that criminal responsibility is different in kind from
moral responsibility, I am not making an appeal to any constitutional
or extra-legal values. The distinction is not based on the
constitutional restraints on police and prosecutorial practices derived
from the Bill of Rights or any philosophical argument about the value
of a free society. It is derived from the internal logic of the criminal
law itself. The purpose of the criminal law is to provide an orderly
society in which citizens are secure in their persons and property; to
protect citizens against harm from the other members of society.
Obviously, to accomplish this end, it must protect citizens against
threats to their persons and property from other members of society
acting in their individual capacities; it must provide protection against
"crminals." However, it would be pointless to do so in a way that left
the citizens exposed to threats to their persons and property from the
individuals acting as governmental enforcement agents. To serve its
purpose, the criminal law must be structured to provide citizens with
the optimal amount of protection to their persons and property
against invasion from all other members of society, whether acting
individually or officially.
The need for protection against the human beings who
administer the criminal justice system explains why criminal
responsibility is inherently different from moral responsibility. Moral
responsibility is an all or nothing affair. One has or has not acted in a
morally culpable way. If one has, he or she is liable to moral censure.
Criminal responsibility, on the other hand, always involves a
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balancing of competing interests. Because the criminal law is
administered by human beings who are as error-prone and
susceptible to temptation as anyone else, every gain in protection
against criminal activity that comes from more effective enforcement
produces a loss in protection against ill-considered or improper
official action. Conversely, every enhancement in protection against
the state hampers governmental agents' ability to provide protection
against individual criminals. Theorists can and do argue about where
the line should be drawn to realize the optimal level of protection, but
the line must be drawn somewhere. Thus, judgments of criminal
responsibility necessarily involve a weighing of competing interests
that judgments of moral responsibility do not.
The recognition of the fundamental. difference between criminal
and moral responsibility, i.e., that judgments of criminal responsibility
necessarily involve consideration of the risk of harm presented by
enforcement agents in a way that judgments of moral responsibility
do not, reveals the defects in the subjectivist arguments for the Model
Penal Code's definition of attempt. By treating criminal
responsibility as though it was isomorphic with moral responsibility,
the subjectivist arguments depersonalize the state. They yield
judgments of criminal responsibility that would be correct only if the
government enforcement mechanism functioned perfectly with no
risk of enforcement error or abuse; that is, as though it was not
administered by human beings. The subjectivists' basic argument for
the Model Penal Code's definition of attempt rests on the
fundamental premise that those who manifest their dangerousness or
depravity through their actions should be subject to criminal
punishment. This is supposed to derive directly from the essential
purpose of criminal law, which subjectivists characterize as the
protection of the persons and property of the citizenry against harm
from their ill-motivated fellows, i.e., from "criminals." But this
characterization of the purpose of the criminal law completely ignores
the danger to citizens' persons and property presented by state
enforcement agents. By analyzing the issue as though it were one of
moral responsibility, the subjectivists implicitly assume a perfectly
functioning enforcement mechanism not burdened by human errors
or weakness of will. Approaching the matter as one of criminal
rather than moral responsibility suggests that the correct
characterization of the purpose of criminal law is the protection of the
persons and property of citizens against harm from all human agents,
whether acting in their individual capacity as criminals or in their
official capacity as state agents of enforcement. But if this is so, it is
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not true that all individuals who manifest their dangerousness or
depravity through their actions should be subject to criminal
punishment. Only as many as can be punished without creating too
great a risk of harm from enforcement agents should be held
criminally responsible. This means that it is possible for one or more
of Jean-Claude, Frank, Clarissa, or Jenny, all of whom are morally
culpable, not to be criminally responsible for attempt because they
represent a class of defendants whose punishment would create too
great a risk of enforcement error or -buse.
The depersonalization of the state that results from treating
criminal responsibility as though it was moral responsibility also
causes the subjectivists to mistake conditions that are merely
necessary for criminal responsibility for those that are sufficient for it.
It is certainly true that punishment is proper only when one has acted
in a blameworthy way; that moral culpability is necessary for
punishment. It is also true that criminal punishment is proper only
when one has acted in a blameworthy way that is at variance with the
ends of the criminal law; that both moral culpability and an action
demonstrating one's dangerousness or depravity are necessary for
criminal punishment. But this implies only that criminal punishment
is improper in the absence of either of these elements, not, as the
subjectivist argument assumes, that it is justified when they are
present. The latter would be the case only if punishing all morally
culpable agents whose actions demonstrate their dangerousness or
depravity posed no risk of harm from enforcement error or abuse; in
other words, if the mechanism of punishment were not administered
by human beings. Because this mechanism is administered by human
beings, however, there is an additional necessary condition for
criminal responsibility: that punishment can be imposed without
creating an unacceptable level of risk of harm from government
agents.
The existence of this third condition for criminal responsibility
converts the subjectivist argument that the Code's definition of
attempt follows from the purposes of punishment into a non sequitur.
The fact that society's interest in deterrence, retribution, and
rehabilitation would all be served by punishing those who take any
action in furtherance of a criminal intention proves only that
punishing such individuals is not unjustified as a pointless infliction of
harm upon them. It does not establish that all such individuals should
be punished unless that can be done without creating an unacceptable
level of risk of harm from government agents. It is only by viewing the
assignment of criminal responsibility as though it were the assignment
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of moral responsibility, i.e., only by viewing the state as a
depersonalized, perfectly functioning enforcement machine, that the
subjectivists can argue that all those who morally deserve punishment
should in fact be criminally punished.
This third necessary condition for the imposition of criminal
responsibility also undermines the subjectivist argument based on the
fundamental normative requirement that like cases be treated alike.
It is true that unless all those who act in furtherance of a criminal
intention are subject to punishment for attempt, parties who are
indistinguishable with regard to their moral blameworthiness will end
up on opposite sides of the liability line. An objectivist definition of
attempt would allow some parties to escape punishment who are
equally or, as Glanville Williams points out, 4 even more morally
blameworthy than those who would be punished. Clarissa or Jenny
might get off scot-free while one who attempted murder with a
harmlessly small dose of poison or who attempted to receive stolen
property that was actually stolen would be incarcerated. But this
does not imply that an objectivist definition of attempt "would have
an arbitrary operation."'5 There is no violation of the duty to treat
like cases alike because cases such as Clarissa's or Jenny's are like
those of their incarcerated counterparts only with respect to their
moral responsibility, not their criminal responsibility. It is criminal
responsibility, however, that renders one liable to criminal
punishment. The principled difference between the cases of those
who escape punishment and those who do not is that the former
cannot be subjected to criminal punishment without an unacceptable
risk of enforcement error or abuse while the latter can. Moral
responsibility looks only to the actions of those to be punished. If
such parties are equally blameworthy, a rule which exempts some
from moral censure would indeed run afoul of the requirement to
treat like cases alike. Criminal responsibility, however, inherently
requires the evaluation of the actions of not only the persons to be
punished, but also those of the agents imposing the punishment.
Cases which are indistinguishable with regard to the actions of the
recipient of punishment may be completely different with regard to
the actions of those meting it out. For purposes of criminal
responsibility, such cases are not alike and do not require similar
disposition.
154. Williams, supra note 149, at 307.
155. Id.
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It should be noted that if my argument for the distinction
between criminal and moral responsibility is correct, it implies only
that the arguments offered in support of the Model Penal Code's
definition of attempt are flawed, not that the Code's definition is not
in fact correct. Proving that the Code's definition accurately
apportions moral responsibility cannot prove that it accurately
apportions criminal responsibility, which is the present concern.
However, whether the Code's definition does accurately apportion
criminal responsibility remains, at this point, an open question. All
criminal punishment presents some risk of enforcement error or
abuse. The crucial issue is how much is too much. The proper
assignment of criminal responsibility requires the optimization of the
balance between protection against harm from criminals and
protection against harm from enforcement agents. To determine
whether the Code's definition is acceptable, we must determine
whether it falls within the acceptable range of risk of enforcement
error and abuse.
But how is this range to be determined? An examination of the
internal logic of the criminal law tells us only that the threat of harm
from criminal activity must be balanced against the threat of harm
from enforcement error and abuse. It tells us nothing about where
this balance should be struck. Making this determination requires an
appeal to the normative values that underlie the criminal law.
V. The "Reason of Policy": The Liberal Bias
of the Criminal Law
I have argued that a correct understanding of criminal
responsibility requires consideration of both the threat presented by
criminal activity and that presented by enforcement error and abuse.
Criminal responsibility is correctly assigned when the balance
between these conflicting values is optimized. But striking this
balance requires a normative standard by which to judge the relative
importance of the values in conflict. Fortunately, such a standard is
close at hand, for the Anglo-American criminal law has a standard of
values embedded within it, something we might call the inherent
liberal bias of the criminal law.
As a political theory, liberalism gives primacy of place to
individual liberty and autonomy. It is usually presented as a
deontological theory that declares that the duty to preserve the
autonomy of the individual members of society (usually embodied in
a set of individual rights) must be respected even if significant gains in
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the aggregate welfare of society could be achieved by violating it."6
Thus, liberalism places a higher normative value on liberty than on
improvements in material welfare or physical security, and when such
values come into conflict, tips the balance toward the preservation of
liberty.'
In the context of the criminal law, liberalism requires that state
enforcement power be curtailed sufficiently to ensure respect for the
autonomy of the citizens. Criminal law may be necessary to provide
for the security of citizens' persons and property, but it does so by
depriving those who violate the law of their liberty. The normative
priority of liberty over security requires that criminal responsibility be
assigned so that increases in security against criminals are not
purchased with decreases in the liberty of law-abiding citizens.
Accordingly, liberalism regards the protection of citizens against state
enforcement error and abuse as relatively more important than
protection against criminal activity. This argument, which is based on
the philosophical commitment to the priority of liberty, is reinforced
with the practical observation that the state generally constitutes a
greater danger to citizens than do individual criminals. Even in a
relatively lawless society, citizens can act to protect themselves
against theft and injury. Installing burglar alarms, purchasing a gun,
forming a neighborhood watch group, and hiring private security
services are all steps citizens can take to protect themselves against
the criminal activity of their fellows. However, there is little citizens
can do to protect themselves against abuse by state officials. Self-help
against official action is itself illegal. The only redress available
against the state is an appeal to the state itself."' This makes the
156. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, Taking Rights Seriously, in TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY 184 (1977).
157. Under almost any definition, liberalism privileges liberty as the pre-eminent
normative value. Perhaps the most conventional reference for this would be Rawls's
theory of justice in which liberty is given priority of place in a lexical ordering to indicate
that liberty is qualitatively differert from the other political values and cannot be
sacrificed for gains in these other values. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE § 39
(1971). There is, of course, much debate over precisely how liberty should be understood,
e.g., positive versus negative liberty, but these issues will not concern us in the present
context. For purposes of the present discussion, a liberal political system can fairly be
described as one that institutionalizes the superior value of political liberty over other
social values including security of property and even of the person.
158. There is no intention to overstate the case. In a democratic society, the state can
and often does provide redress against abuse by its agents. Citizens are not at the mercy
of the police and prosecutorial agents as they are under more repressive regimes.
However, even in a democratic system, the risks are significant, as members of unpopular
or discriminated-against minority groups can attest. And the incentives within the
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danger of a state that has slipped its bonds significantly greater than
that posed by even the most malicious of criminals.
There is, of course, nothing sacrosanct about liberalism, which is
under attack from various academic and ideological quarters. It is,
however, the value system that is embedded in the Anglo-American
criminal law. The idea that a state that does not respect the rights of
its citizens is a greater danger than individual criminals is the source
of many of the structural features built into the criminal law. The
presumption of innocence, the prosecutorial burden to prove every
element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt, and the requirement
of a unanimous jury verdict for conviction all exemplify the inherent
liberal bias of the criminal law. Even the constitutional protections of
the Bill of Rights such as the right to trial by jury, to be represented
by counsel, to confront one's accuser and be informed of the charges
brought against one, and to be free from compulsion to testify against
oneself and from double jeopardy were originally derived from the
common law of crime. 9 The oft-quoted maxim that it is better that
nine guilty people go free than that one innocent person be wrongly
convicted reflects the liberal standard of values that is an imminent
feature of Anglo-American criminal law.1'6 Thus, basing judgments of
criminal responsibility on a liberal normative standard that privileges
citizens' interest in protection against state enforcement error and
abuse over their interest in protection against criminals ensures that
criminal responsibility is assigned in a manner consistent with the
law's internal value structure-surely a strong consideration in its
favor.
A full consideration of the relative merits of a liberal value
structure as opposed to more right- or left-wing alternatives is
criminal justice system are such that even prosecutors motivated solely to protect the
public can be tempted to take shortcuts with the rights of those they consider a danger to
society. If the target of such prosecutorial attention has a criminal record or a
disreputable character, there is usually very little in the way of official redress available.
159. See, e.g., LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT ch. 1 (1986).
160. No claim is being made that there was ever any conscious design to inculcate
liberal values into the criminal law. What I am calling the liberal bias of the criminal law
evolved out of historical happenstance, id. at 40 (early formation of the Norman
administrative state); see also HAROLD BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION 440-45 (1983),
and the struggle between first the barons and later Parliament and the Crown for
supremacy. However, centuries of common law evolution produced an in-built bias
against overreaching by those in control of the enforcement mechanism that was
wholeheartedly embraced by the drafters of the federal Bill of Rights and most state
constitutions when the United States was founded. For purposes of this article, my claim
is merely that there is a liberal bias in the criminal law, not that it represents a social
contract or any conscious acceptance of a liberal standard of criminal justice.
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obviously beyond the scope of the present work. I suggest, however,
that in the absence of a reason to reject the fundamental liberal bias
of the criminal law as presently constituted, this inherent bias can
supply the "reason of policy" for narrowing the scope of attempt
liability demanded by the subjectivist challenge.
The argument for this conclusion rests on the claim that
achieving the level of protection against excessive governmental
interference with citizens' liberty that is required by the inherent
liberalism of the criminal law mandates an objective condition for
attempt liability. The requirement that the prosecution establish an
objectively verifiable element before convicting a citizen of attempt
acts as a check on prosecutorial abuse. Imagine, for example, a
crusading anti-drug prosecutor willing to stop at nothing to shut down
the drug trade. The prosecutor decides to pressure a suspected drug
courier into testifying against his kingpin boss by charging him with
the attempt to smuggle a controlled substance into the country when
he flies into the United States with talcum powder in his luggage.
Under the Model Penal Code, the only thing the prosecutor need
prove is that the courier believed the talcum powder to be heroin,
something it would be difficult for one with a record of drug
smuggling to convincingly deny. Or imagine a prosecutor trying to
extort testimony from a suspected member of organized crime by
sending a police agent to offer him a valuable product at a below-
market price and then charging him with the attempt to receive stolen
property. Would such a defendant be willing to face a jury if, as is the
case under the Model Penal Code definition, all the prosecutor has to
prove is that the defendant believed the product to be stolen
property? The requirement that the prosecutor establish an objective
element of the actus reus acts to prevent this sort of prosecutorial
abuse.
Professor Arnold Enker has provided an eloquent argument for
the claim that the inherent liberalism of the criminal law requires an
objective condition for attempt. Enker begins by appealing to H.L.A.
Hart's argument that a major function of the mens rea requirement is
to "maximize the individual's power at any time to predict the
likelihood that the sanctions of the criminal law will be applied to
him. '16 Enker agrees with Hart that if the purpose of the criminal
161. H.L.A. Hart, Legal Responsibility and Excuses, in DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM
IN THE AGE OF MODERN SCIENCE 81, 99 (S. Hook ed., 1965). See also H.L.A. HART,
THE MORALITY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 26 (1964), where Hart expands on this point as
follows:
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law is to protect citizens from harm, the mens rea requirement is
necessary to protect citizens from the risk of harm from the state:
It is the function of the criminal law to promote the security and
well being of members of society by securing for them a high
measure of protection from harmful acts. But since society
achieves such protection by inflicting harm on those who would
commit such acts, it must take care not to offset this gain in security
by unduly increasing the risks that persons will be subjected to
official harm unpredictably. Acts can occur accidentally, but the
state of mind that accompanies one's acts is entirely within the
individual's control. Thus, by recognizing mens rea as an
indispensable element of crimes, we substantially increase the
individual's power to control his freedom from punishment.162
Enker simply extends this argument to the actus reus. Both actus reus
and mens rea are requirements for criminal liability. As such, both
serve to protect citizens from oppression by the state. The rationale
that underlies the mens rea requirement applies equally to the actus
reus requirement:
But it would be shortsighted to think that only the mens rea
element serves this function. Mens rea is within one's control but,
as already seen, it is not subject to direct proof. More importantly,
perhaps, it is not subject to direct refutation either. It is the subject
of inference and speculation. The act requirement with its relative
fixedness, its greater visibility and difficulty of fabrication, serves to
provide additional security and predictability by limiting the scope
of the criminal law to those who have engaged in conduct that is
itself objectively forbidden and objectively verifiable. Security
from officially imposed harm comes not only from the knowledge
In a system in which proof of mens rea is no longer a necessary condition for
conviction, the occasions for official interferences with our lives and for
compulsion will be vastly increased. Take, for example, the notion of a criminal
assault. If the doctrine of mens rea were swept away, every blow, even if it was
apparent to a policeman that it was purely accidental or merely careless and
therefore not, according to the present law, a criminal assault, would be a matter
for investigation under the new scheme, since the possibilities of a curable or
treatable condition would have to be investigated and the condition if serious
treated by medical or penal methods. No doubt under the new dispensation, as
at present, prosecuting authorities would use their common sense; but very
considerable discretionary powers would have to be entrusted to them to sift
from the mass the cases worth investigation as possible candidates for
therapeutic or penal treatment. No one could view this kind of expansion of
police powers with equanimity, for with it will come great uncertainty for the
individual: official interferences with his life will be more frequent but he will be
less able to predict their incidence if any accidental or careless blow may be an
occasion for them.
162. Enker, supra note 58, at 688.
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that one's thoughts are pure but that one's acts are similarly pure.
So long as a citizen does not engage in forbidden conduct, he has
little need to worry about possible erroneous official conclusions
about his guilty mind."'
Thus, a major purpose of the actus reus requirement is to set "an
objective limit to those situations and persons that can become the
objects of official assertions of control."' ' Enker argues that the
Model Penal Code's definition of attempt, which allows any action at
all to serve as the actus reus of attempt when it is accompanied by the
required mens rea, cannot serve this purpose. Only a definition that
requires the prosecution to prove an antecedently defined objective
feature of a defendant's conduct can.
In asserting that the liberal bias of the criminal law provides the
normative justification for requiring an objective condition for
attempt liability, I have no desire to overstate the case. Despite the
above-quoted maxim that it is better that nine guilty people go free
than that one innocent person be wrongfully convicted, I make no
claim that the balance between protection against enforcement error
and abuse and protection against criminal activity demanded by the
inherent liberalism of the criminal law is subject to precise
quantification. The appeal to liberalism that I am making may supply
nothing more than a general rule of prudence that when a balance is
required between the need to protect citizens against enforcement
error and abuse and the need to protect them against criminals, it is
best to err on the side of protection against enforcement error. If so,
it may be insufficient to resolve very close cases in which the
competing interests are evenly balanced. Liability for impossible
attempts is not such a case, however. In the context of attempting the
impossible, even a minimal rule of prudence is sufficient to ground
the requirement of an objective condition for liability.
Adding an objective condition to the actus reus of attempt adds
somewhat to the danger citizens will experience from their fellows.
Assume for the moment that the objective condition mirrors the
common law rule that exempted legally impossible attempts from
liability.65 There will be people like Jenny who will have done
everything that they believe to be necessary to break the law without
either succeeding or satisfying the objective condition for attempt
liability. Such people will not be liable to criminal sanction and will
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. This assumption will be abandoned subsequently. See infra Part VI.
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remain free to break the law in the future as the authors of the Model
Penal Code contend.'66 The added danger to society will be rather
slight, however. Most of those who attempt to commit crimes and fail
will still be liable to the criminal sanction. Only in the somewhat
unusual cases in which a defendant has made a mistake about a pure
circumstance would he or she constitute an ongoing danger.
On the other hand, the lack of an objective condition for liability
poses a significant risk of enforcement error or abuse. Almost all of
us jump at the chance to purchase an item we want at a bargain price,
often from non-retail sources. How secure can those of us with
criminal records or other associations or characteristics that reduce
our credibility with a jury be if a prosecutor can obtain a conviction
for receiving stolen property merely by convincing a jury that we
believed the property to be stolen? A subjectivist definition of
attempt would allow one to be convicted of the attempt to possess a
controlled substance when one possessed an uncontrolled substance
he or she mistakenly believed to be controlled.'67 Most prosecutors
are entirely honest. But the incentives within the criminal justice
system reward those who obtain convictions and "get the bad guys off
the streets." One of the best ways to do this is to get participants in
criminal enterprises to become informers or turn state's evidence. A
law that allows a prosecutor to pressure drug suspects to inform by
charging those who have baby powder or sugar in their homes with
the attempt to possess a controlled substance and challenging them to
convince a jury that they did not believe it to be heroin provides a
temptation to abuse that may be difficult to resist. 68 Furthermore,
even in the absence of abuse, a subjectivist definition of attempt
creates strong incentives for informers and those facing charges
themselves to accuse others of possessing what they believed to be
controlled substances, whether they do or not, in return for monetary
166. See supra text accompanying note 110.
167. This was the issue presented in United States v. Oviedo, 525 F.2d 881, 883 (5th Cir.
1976).
168. It may be argued that in the real world, the definition of attempt is almost
immaterial to the danger of enforcement error and abuse. A prosecutor who would
threaten to bring a false charge of attempt to posses a controlled substance under a
subjectivist definition of attempt would be equally willing to plant drugs on the suspect if
there were an objectivist definition of attempt. Even if this were true, however, planting
the drugs requires enlisting the help of others and taking active steps that may be
discovered. This is certainly more difficult than merely bringing a charge one knows to be
groundless but for which one has a reasonable prospect for conviction or plea bargain.
The fact that the potential for abuse exists under the law as it now stands cannot be a good
reason for making it easier to engage in the abusive practices.
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payments or leniency in sentencing. To the extent that police and
prosecutors rely on such evidence, the risk of enforcement error is
greatly increased.
These considerations suggest that in the context of attempt,
removing the requirement of an objective condition for the actus reus
significantly reduces the burden of proof on the prosecution in order
to punish a relatively small additional number of morally culpable
actors. It thus creates an incremental but wide-ranging increase in the
risk of enforcement error and abuse for very little added protection
against criminal activity. Even if the inherent liberalism of the
criminal law provides no more than a prudential rule to err on the
side of protection against enforcement error and abuse, that would be
sufficient to justify requiring the prosecution to establish an objective
condition to obtain a conviction for attempt. At least in the case of
attempt, the reduction in criminal activity to be gained is simply too
small to justify the increased risk from the state.
The subjectivists are entirely correct to point out that requiring
an objective condition for attempt liability makes obtaining a
conviction in non-abusive cases more difficult and will result in some
who deserve punishment escaping liability. But, of course, so does
the exclusionary rule. The objectivists claim that this is the price we
pay for living in a liberal society; "the price of the choice made long
ago in favour of guaranteeing that the innocent be protected, that the
heavy weight of the criminal sanction be not imposed too broadly and
that the process work moderately rather than oppressively. '" 6 9 And
this constitutes the reason of policy that justifies a narrower definition
of attempt than that supplied by the Model Penal Code.
VI. Drawing the Line: A Proposed Definition for Attempt
In Parts I and II of this Article, I suggested that the common law
distinction between legal and factual impossibility was not as
impenetrable as modern courts and commentators make it seem. In
Part III, I noted that despite the intelligibility of the distinction, the
question still remained as to whether there was a normative
justification for the common law impossibility defense. It now
appears that the recognition in Part IV that, unlike moral
responsibility, criminal responsibility requires a balancing of the
interests in protection against criminal activity with protection against
enforcement error and abuse and, in Part V, that the inherent
169. Temkin, supra note 107, at 66.
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liberalism of the criminal law requires this balance to favor protection
against enforcement error and abuse, provides a positive answer to
this question.
It will be recalled that the defense of legal impossibility evolved
because when a defendant was mistaken about a pure circumstance,
his or her conduct did not fit the model of a failed effort to achieve a
criminal end, i.e., that his or her conduct did not "look like an
attempt.""'7 Jenny's conduct in attempting to receive stolen property
is outwardly indistinguishable from that of someone legally
purchasing a low-priced item from a street vendor. The supporters of
the Model Penal Code definition argued that this should not
constitute a defense to a charge of attempt because whether the
defendant's conduct had the outward appearance of an attempt or not
was irrelevant to his or her moral culpability. Although this is true,
whether a defendant's conduct looks like an attempt is highly relevant
to the question of whether the effort to punish it will create too great
a risk of enforcement error or abuse. Empowering state enforcement
agents to punish those whose conduct is indistinguishable from that of
innocent citizens solely because of what is in their minds provides the
enforcement agents with more power and temptation to interfere with
the liberty of citizens than can be justified by the added security that
would be achieved. Thus, the common law impossibility defense is
normatively justified not because the defendants who utilize it do not
deserve punishment, but because it is necessary to protect law-abiding
citizens from the risk of enforcement error and abuse.
The twin observations that criminal responsibility requires a
balancing of interests between protection against criminals and
protection against the state and that this balance should favor
protection against the state also supplies a principled explanation as
to why the defendant's conduct should be characterized from an
objective viewpoint rather than the defendant's subjective viewpoint.
It will be recalled that much of the confusion surrounding the
distinction between legal and factual impossibility arose from the
difficulty in characterizing the defendant's conduct. Courts were
unsure as to whether to incorporate the defendant's mistaken belief
into their description; whether to describe Jenny's conduct as
receiving an unstolen laptop or a laptop she believed to be stolen.7 '
The authors of the Model Penal Code argued that the courts should
170. See supra text accompanying notes 62-65.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 76-77.
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adopt the defendant's "mental frame of reference' 7 2 because the
defendant's dangerousness, and hence moral culpability, is
manifested by what the defendant believes himself or herself to be
doing. Jenny's conduct should be characterized as receiving a stolen
laptop, as she herself sees it, not as receiving an unstolen laptop,
which is in fact the case. This argument, which would be
unexceptionable if we were concerned with moral responsibility,
ignores the issue of enforcement error and abuse that must be
considered in making determinations of criminal responsibility.
Characterizing the defendant's conduct on the basis of what is in the
defendant's mind would allow the state enforcement agents to punish
those whose outward conduct is indistinguishable from entirely
innocent activity. But, as noted above, this creates too great a risk of
enforcement error and abuse to be justified by the gain in security it
achieves. Hence, the defendant's conduct should be characterized
objectively, as it would appear to an outside observer with no access
to the defendant's thoughts, precisely as required by the common law
impossibility defense.'73
Although these observations provide a normative grounding for
the common law's refusal to convict in cases of legal impossibility,
they do not support the common law distinction between legal and
factual impossibility as it actually developed. The common law of
impossibility held not only that there should be no liability in cases of
legal impossibility, but also that there should be liability in cases of
factual impossibility. But if my account of the nature of criminal
responsibility is correct, not all cases of factually impossible attempts
should sustain liability. Rather than being too broad as the
subjectivists contend, the impossibility defense is actually too narrow.
Although it is true that whenever a defendant has made a
mistake about a pure circumstance his or her conduct is outwardly
indistinguishable from innocent activity, it is not true that a
defendant's conduct is outwardly indistinguishable from innocent
activity only when he or she has made a mistake about a pure
circumstance. The conduct of one who is mistaken about a
consequential circumstance can still appear to be perfectly innocent,
as the examples of Clarissa and Frank demonstrate. If the reason
why there should be no liability in cases of legally impossible attempts
is that the defendant's conduct is innocent in appearance, then it is
172. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01, cmt. 3 at 308 (1985). See generally text
accompanying notes 110-13.
173. See supra text accompanying note 77.
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equally true that there should be no liability in cases of factually
impossible attempts in which the defendant's conduct is innocent in
appearance. The risk of enforcement error and abuse that arises from
the effort to subject Clarissa or Frank to punishment for attempt is
precisely the same as that required to punish Jenny.
This observation gives renewed significance to two of the
previously considered objections lodged against the Model Penal
Code's definition of attempt. In Part III, I dismissed several of the
objections brought against the Code's position as being either
mischaracterized or misdirected.'74  However, the claims that the
Code's definition would allow convictions to be based on unreliable
forms of evidence and permit the punishment of irrational attempts
did accurately address the Code's position. These objections were
designed to show that the Code extended attempt liability too
broadly. The subjectivist response to these objections was to claim
that those who engage in innocent-appearing and irrational attempts
are just as morally blameworthy, and hence just as deserving of
punishment, as those who engage in more overt or effective attempts.
The subjectivist challenge was based on the claim that in the absence
of a principled reason why people like Jean-Claude, Frank, Clarissa,
174. It is worth noting that in light of the distinction between moral and criminal
responsibility, three of these objections, i.e., that the Code's position authorized improper
preventative detention, allowed punishment for thoughts alone, and violated the principle
of legality, could be rehabilitated. As previously discussed, because the Code requires
past action for attempt liability, it does not authorize improper preventative detention.
See supra text following note 122. And if the state enforcement mechanism functioned
flawlessly and honestly, the Code's definition would indeed pose no risk of preventative
detention. But the state enforcement mechanism does not function flawlessly. By
authorizing the punishment of conduct that is indistinguishable from entirely innocent
activity, the Code's definition creates the incentive for state enforcement agents to
improperly bring a charge of attempt as a means of preventative detention. Thus, the
objection can be recast to assert not that the Code's definition authorizes improper
preventative detention, but that it creates too great a risk that attempt charges will be
improperly brought to achieve that end than can be justified by the small gain in security it
achieves.
Similar arguments apply to the other two objections. Because the Code's definition
requires action for liability, it does not authorize punishment for thoughts alone. See
supra text accompanying note 126. However, by allowing state enforcement agents to
bring charges on the basis of innocent-appearing conduct, it gives those agents too much
power to improperly use attempt to punish for criminal intentions that in fact have not
been acted upon to be justified by the small gains it achieves. Thus, although the Code
does not authorize punishment for thoughts alone, it does create an unacceptable risk that
citizens will be punished for thoughts alone. Likewise, the Code's definition does not
violate the principle of legality by authorizing prosecutors to make up new crimes. See
supra text preceding note 133. But by authorizing them to bring charges of attempt on the
basis of outwardly innocent activity, it creates an unacceptable risk that they will do so.
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and Jenny should escape punishment when pickpockets reaching into
empty pockets and jealous lovers inaccurately shooting at their rivals
do not, these objections are without force.t75 That principled reason
has now been supplied. Jean-Claude, Frank, Clarissa, and Jenny may
indeed be indistinguishable from their incarcerated counterparts with
regard to their moral responsibility, but this does not imply that they
are indistinguishable from them with regard to their criminal
responsibility. If the effort to punish Jean-Claude, Frank, Clarissa, or
Jenny creates an unjustified risk of enforcement error and abuse, then
they should not be held criminally responsible even though they are
morally blameworthy.
The objection that the Code's definition of attempt would allow
convictions to be based on unreliable forms of evidence is merely an
alternative way of asserting that the effort to subject people like
Frank and Clarissa whose outward conduct is innocent in appearance
to punishment does create an unjustified risk of enforcement error
and abuse. When conduct that is indistinguishable from innocent
activity can serve as the actus reus of attempt, convictions can indeed
be obtained on the basis of "the less reliable forms of evidence such
as questionable admissions, the testimony of informers and
accomplices, and proof of prior convictions." '176 Especially in the
context of the war on drugs where such evidence necessarily
comprises the bulk of the prosecution's case, the absence of a
requirement that there be some conduct that objectively suggests
criminality poses a significant risk of enforcement error and abuse.
One caught with a small quantity of cocaine and charged with
possession of a controlled substance could actually fare better than
one arrested with a pound of sugar and charged with attempted
possession.
The objection that the Code's definition of attempt would permit
punishment of irrational attempts is a way of asserting that the effort
to subject people like Jean-Claude to punishment likewise creates an
unjustified risk of enforcement error and abuse. Irrational attempts
may be overt in the sense that they are distinguishable from entirely
innocent activity. Pushing needles into voodoo images, casting spells,
or even firing toy phasers at one's intended victim may adequately
demonstrate the defendant's desire for the victim's death. However,
such actions do not demonstrate the fixity of purpose usually required
for criminal punishment. A definition of attempt that authorizes the
175. See supra text preceding note 142.
176. Enker, supra note 58, at 682.
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conviction of such defendants in order to protect the public from
those who would try again with more effective means also creates the
risk that those who desire a criminal end but do not have the will to
produce it will be subject to criminal punishment. In this context, the
concern is more with enforcement error than abuse since prosecutors
have little incentive to gain convictions by locking up people who act
irrationally. However, the skepticism about officials' ability to
distinguish those who constitute a genuine danger of future harmful
action from those who do not (which was the basis of the flawed
charge that the Model Penal Code's definition was impracticable 77) is
entirely relevant here. Whatever the number of irrational attemptors,
it can be only a very small percentage who actually have the will to try
again with more effective means. A definition of attempt that permits
punishment for irrational attempts also empowers the state
enforcement agents to try to cull out the truly dangerous from those
without the fixity of purpose to proceed. This puts the vast majority
of non-dangerous individuals at risk of criminal punishment in order
to subject the very few who are truly dangerous to the criminal
sanction. Given the inherent liberal bias of the criminal law, this
cannot be justified.
These observations suggest the contours of a definition of
attempt that correctly assigns criminal, as opposed to moral,
responsibility. Generally speaking, criminal responsibility requires
that crimes be defined so as to punish as many of those who manifest
their dangerousness or depravity through their actions as possible
without creating an unjustifiable risk of enforcement error and abuse.
In the context of attempt, the check on enforcement error and abuse
comes in the form of an objective condition for the actus reus.
Because a definition that allowed any act at all to serve as an actus
reus gives state enforcement agents too much power to curtail the
liberty of law-abiding citizens, the prosecution must be required to
establish that the defendant's conduct has met an antecedently
specified condition. This condition must be such as to eliminate from
liability both those whose actions are outwardly indistinguishable
from entirely innocent activity and those whose actions are so
irrationally ill-suited to their intended ends as to raise a question
about the defendant's fixity of purpose."' What remains, then, to
177. See supra text accompanying note 118.
178. These conditions clearly indicate that despite the common law evolution of the
distinction between legal and factual impossibility, not all factually impossible attempts
should give rise to liability. Jean-Claude's, Frank's, and Clarissa's actions all involve
mistakes about consequential circumstances and hence constitute factually impossible
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fully meet the subjectivist challenge is to identify the requisite
condition clearly enough to show that it can practically be applied by
courts, i.e., to show that "a line between punishable and non-
punishable impossible attempts can be satisfactorily drawn."'7 9
One candidate for the necessary condition is the requirement
that the defendant's conduct be overt, meaning that it would suggest
criminal activity to a neutral observer with no access to the
defendant's thoughts. The main problem with the Model Penal
Code's definition of attempt is that it authorizes the prosecution of
conduct that is indistinguishable from innocent activity. Requiring
overt conduct eliminates this possibility and with it the main source of
potential enforcement error and abuse.
This solution has been suggested by Professor Arnold Enker in a
highly influential article.8 ' As previously discussed,' Enker argued
that allowing innocent-appearing acts to serve as the actus reus of an
attempt meant that convictions could be based on unreliable forms of
evidence. To avoid this, Enker proposed the requirement that "the
criminal act itself, as distinguished from the act with its accompanying
mens rea, should set off the actor from the rest of society. The act
should be unique rather than so commonplace that it is engaged in by
attempts. Yet Jean-Claude's do not demonstrate the fixity of purpose necessary to justify
authorizing state enforcement action and Frank's and Clarissa's are perfectly innocent to
outward appearance.
There is a perfectly logical explanation for why the common law rules seem to
overlook these types of situations. The common law evolves in response to cases that
actually arise. The defense of legal impossibility arose because cases in which the
defendant had made a mistake about a pure circumstance were brought to trial and
convictions obtained. This provided appellate courts the opportunity to review the
convictions. On the other hand, I am unaware of any actual cases in which charges were
brought against someone who committed an irrational attempt. Similarly, there are few, if
any, actual cases of entirely innocent-appearing attempts, probably because in the absence
of a confession, such cases would never come to a prosecutor's attention. Thus, appellate
courts never had the opportunity to consider such cases directly; at least not until long
after the distinction between legal and factual impossibility had hardened into settled law.
The common law created a defense for legally impossible attempts because such cases
came up. It did not create a defense for innocent-appearing or irrational factually
impossible attempts because such cases did not come up. The commentators who
identified the common law defense and labeled it legal impossibility simply concluded that
all cases that did not constitute legal impossibility gave rise to liability. Once this analysis
gained widespread acceptance, even if the courts were presented with an irrational or
innocent-appearing factually impossible attempt, they would be likely to rule in favor of
liability.
179. Williams, supra note 121, at 55.
180. Enker, supra note 58, at 665.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 137-40.
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persons not in violation of the law." '182 Enker's article was persuasive
enough so that the Fifth Federal Circuit adopted his proposal almost
verbatim. In United States v. Oviedo,'83 the court held that a
conviction for attempt required that "the objective acts performed,
without any reliance on the accompanying mens rea, [must] mark the
defendant's conduct as criminal in nature. The acts should be unique
rather than so commonplace that they are engaged in by persons not
in violation of the law."'" This requirement was subsequently
adopted by the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits as well.'
This suggestion has much to recommend it. In the first place, it
encompasses and therefore preserves the common law defense of
legal impossibility, which we have seen to be normatively justified.
Because the actions of one who has made a mistake about a pure
circumstance appear innocent to a neutral observer, 186 such an
individual would not be subject to liability under the proposed
condition. Furthermore, it excludes from liability the majority of
cases that present an unacceptable risk of enforcement error and
abuse. Requiring the prosecution to establish an element beyond
merely what the defendant was thinking reduces the opportunity and
182. Enker, supra note 58, at 689.
183. 525 F.2d 881.
184. Id. at 885. In adopting this requirement, the Fifth Circuit also explicitly adopted
Enker's reasoning in support of it, stating, "[t]o the extent that this requirement is
preserved it prevents the conviction of persons engaged in innocent acts on the basis of a
mens rea proved through speculative inferences, unreliable forms of testimony, and past
criminal conduct." Id.
185. See United States v. Everett, 692 F.2d 596, 600 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Innella, 690 F.2d 834, 835 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Bagnariol, 665 F.2d 877, 896
(9th Cir. 1981).
186. A couple of caveats are necessary in this context. First, it is logically possible for
the actions of one who is mistaken about a pure circumstance to be overt if he or she were
to verbalize his or her criminal intention while performing the otherwise innocent-
appearing acts. Jenny could call out to the public how thrilled she is to be receiving a
stolen laptop while making her purchase. In such a case, conviction would be proper,
however, because allowing prosecution of such unusual criminals does not increase the
risk of enforcement error or abuse. The prosecution is not empowered to gain a
conviction strictly on the basis of evidence of what was in the defendant's mind. Second,
whether conduct is overt must be understood in relation to the particular crime charged.
For example, one who breaks and enters a home under the belief that it is night when it is
in fact day is acting in a way that provides evidence that he or she is acting on a criminal
intent. However, it does not supply evidence that he or she is acting on the intent to
commit a burglary. Such an individual could be charged with the completed crime of
breaking and entering, but could not be charged with attempted burglary. To be overt for
purposes of a charge of attempt, the defendant's conduct must indicate to a neutral
observer the intention to commit the crime for which the charge of attempt is to be
brought. This is the sense in which one can say that a defendant acting under a mistake as
to a pure circumstance has acted in an innocent-appearing way.
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the temptation for state enforcement agents to bring unfounded
charges of attempt for ulterior reasons, thereby reducing the risk of
enforcement abuse. It also decreases the likelihood that charges will
be mistakenly brought on the basis of false or ambiguous information
regarding the defendant's state of mind, e.g., on the basis of informer
testimony, thereby reducing the risk of enforcement error. This
clearly represents a major improvement over the purely subjectivist
approach of the Model Penal Code.
Although requiring a defendant's conduct to be overt is certainly
a step in the right direction and has the virtue of having already been
adopted in a few jurisdictions, I do not believe it is the best
articulation of the required objective condition for attempt liability.
Perhaps this is because it has a rather ad hoc quality. The main
problem with the Model Penal Code's definition is that it allows
convictions to be based solely on evidence of what the defendant was
thinking. Enker's solution was designed to and does remedy this
problem. However, it does not address the problem of irrational
attempts, which, because they are overt, would still give rise to
attempt liability. Further, it seems to be a solution designed
specifically for attempt, and as such, lacks a principled connection to
a more general theory of criminal liability. 7
187. This criticism should not be misunderstood. I am suggesting only that Enker's
proposal that the proper objective condition for attempt liability is that the defendant's
conduct be overt is not theoretically grounded, not that his assertion that an objective
condition is necessary is not. Indeed, Enker presents an impressive theoretical argument
for the latter point as evidenced by his discussion of the difference between the "crime"
and "criminal" models of criminal investigation:
At the risk of some exaggeration, we might posit two models of investigation.
Traditionally, the emphasis was on the investigation of crimes rather than
criminals. A crime had been committed and the officials sought its perpetrator.
Not having made up their minds in advance as to the identity of the person they
sought, the direction of the investigation was undetermined; it was controlled to a
significant degree by the objective facts developed. More recently, in part the
result of efforts to combat organized crime, there has been a greater emphasis on
the investigation of individuals and the search for crimes for which the chosen
individuals can be prosecuted.
Under the "crime" model, the facts of a crime determined to a degree the
persons on whom official suspicion focused, whereas under the "criminal" system
no such element of neutrality is introduced.
Enker, supra note 58, at 703-04 (footnotes omitted).
Enker argues that the criminal model of investigation is inconsistent with the inherent
liberalism of the criminal law:
Both models of investigation operate within a legal system that presumes
innocence and requires proof of guilt to the satisfaction of a jury. But in the
"crime" model, the presumption of innocence takes on added meaning from the
fact that the prosecutor will weigh the evidence carefully before deciding to
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I believe that there is another candidate for the necessary
objective condition that is both more comprehensive and theoretically
more satisfying. To explain what this is, however, requires me to
broaden my focus for a moment. My argument for an objective
condition for attempt liability was based on the premises that
determinations of criminal responsibility require a balancing of the
citizens' interest in protection against criminal activity with their
interest in protection against state enforcement error and abuse and
that the inherent liberalism of the criminal law skews this balance in
favor of protection against the state. These premises, however, apply
not merely to the crime of attempt, but to all crimes. The way they
manifest themselves in the context of completed crimes is in the
general requirement that criminal prohibitions be designed to avert
harm to the public.
The criminal law provides the state with a powerful instrument
for social control. The challenge this presents is to ensure that the
criminal law be used only to secure the persons and property of the
citizenry and not as a mechanism of oppression. Requiring that all
criminal prohibitions be directed against an identifiable harm to the
public is a way of guaranteeing that this remains the case. All
criminal provisions curtail the liberty of the citizenry. Showing that
these restrictions are justified requires showing how the actions to be
prohibited pose a threat to the security of the persons or property of
prosecute. Prosecutional screening will eliminate cases in which the evidence,
though sufficient to go to the jury, is weak or is based on witnesses of doubtful
credibility. And in cases that pass such screening the jury, having no bias against
the defendant, may still find reasonable doubt. These protections do not
function so well in the "criminal" model. The law enforcement authorities make
up their minds about the defendant before the evidence is developed, and being
engaged in a search for a case that can be "made," the prosecutor will not screen
out potential cases based on doubtful witnesses. And the jury, having been
conditioned by the authorities for years to believe that X is a Mafia leader or a
labor racketeer, is far more likely to believe the doubtful witness or draw the
questionable inference against the defendant.
Id. at 704-05.
Enker also argues that this inherent liberalism is inconsistent with constitutional
safeguards: "Double jeopardy retains its meaningfulness as a protection against
harassment when a specific crime is the object of attention. It becomes a very limited
protection when the government decides that X is dangerous to society and invests
enormous resources to research his entire life to seek prosecutable actions." Id. at 704.
By associating the Model Penal Code's emphasis on punishing dangerous persons with the
criminal model of investigation, Enker presents an excellent reason for its rejection in
preference to an objective condition that is necessary to ensure "[tjhe effectiveness of the
trial process as a control over prosecutional decisions." Id. at 705. What Enker does not
do is provide a firm theoretical grounding for his claim that the necessary objective
condition is that the defendant's conduct be overt.
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the citizenry, that is, a showing of the harm that these actions will
cause. 8' Thus, the requirement that criminal prohibitions be directed
against harm to the public is the mechanism by which the inherent
liberalism of the criminal law is operationalized. 9
Returning our focus now to attempt, the requirement of harm
provides a useful analytical tool for determining the nature of the
required objective condition for liability. For the prohibition on
attempt to be normatively justified, it must be designed to protect the
public from an identifiable harm. By determining the nature of this
harm, we can determine the class of actions that threaten it, and
hence the class of actions to be proscribed by attempt. The necessary
objective condition will then be the one that restricts attempt liability
to this class of actions.
But what is the harm of an attempt? An answer frequently given
to this question is that it is the danger or threat that the harm of the
substantive offense will occur." I do not believe that this is a tenable
response, however. The effort to explain how the failure to produce
harm can present a danger of harm almost always devolves into a
debate over semantics. Because attempts are failures, the risk of any
particular attempt succeeding is always zero. The defendant's actual
conduct presents no danger of the harm of the substantive offense
188. Such a requirement derives directly from the "harm" principle most often
associated with John Stuart Mill's injunction that:
the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection.
That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 10-11 (David Spitz ed., 1975) (1859).
189. Professor Paul Ryu has provided an excellent explanation of how this applies in
the context of attempt as follows:
The ideology of a free society, however, requires that no person should be
subject to punishment beyond a necessary minimum. For "minimum respect for
human dignity enjoins the alleviation of unnecessary suffering and maintaining of
bodily integrity (well-being)." If no social harm has resulted from the act of the
accused, although failure of the result is due to a pure accident unrelated to any
merit on his part, the accident should be considered in his favor in order to
safeguard his well-being to the utmost extent permissible.
Ryu, supra note 28, at 1174 (quoting LASSWELL, POWER AND PERSONALITY 123 (1948)).
190. See, e.g., GROSS, supra note 31, at 196; Crocker, supra note 63. Gross argues that
conduct poses a threat of harm when the harm is "expectable," meaning that "the actor
had reason to believe that what he was doing would bring about the harm he intended."
GROSS, supra note 31, at 215. This is the case "whenever the belief is, under the
circumstances, a rational one." Id. at 226. Crocker argues that conduct poses a threat of
harm or "impose[s] upon society," Crocker, supra note 63, at 1058, if it creates an
objective risk of harm, i.e., something that would suggest the risk of harm to an ideal
observer. Id. at 1099.
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being produced. This means that the harm of attempt must be the
danger presented by conduct of the type that the defendant has
engaged in. But this inevitably leads to debate over both which
characteristics of the defendant's conduct should be included in the
description of the relevant type of conduct and what likelihood of
success is required for the relevant type of conduct to be considered
sufficiently dangerous or threatening. The former judgment often
becomes entangled in the effort to characterize an ideal observer'91 or
to define what a rational person would perceive,'92 while the latter
typically becomes bogged down in ungrounded discussions of
probability.9 Especially in the context of impossible attempts, the
effort to identify the danger presented by an attempt that cannot
possibly succeed inevitably leads to the type of metaphysical or
disguised normative question that led to the second part of the
subjectivist challenge in the first place. Such a definition of the harm
of attempt is extremely unlikely to provide "a line between
punishable and non-punishable impossible attempts"'94 that can
practically be applied by courts.
I believe that a better answer has been provided by Professor
Thomas Weigend, who suggests that the harm caused by the crime of
attempt is the spread of public alarm.9 Weigend reached this
conclusion by examining several of the archaic inchoate offenses that
were the precursors of attempt such as the prohibitions on being a
vagabond, going armed, and lying in wait. He noticed that:
[a]ll of these diverse forerunners of today's criminal attempt have
one common feature: they penalize behavior which does not bring
about actual harm, but which tends to cause public alarm. What
made these actions appear reprehensible was not the actual danger
so much as the fact that they are apt to disturb the peace in the
community and threaten the feeling of safety of all those who watch
or hear about the offender's conduct.96
191. See, e.g., Crocker, supra note 63, at 1099.
192. See, e.g., GROSS, supra note 31, at 215, 226.
193. See, e.g., Crocker, supra note 63:
Exactly how much risk in quantitative terms is enough, is a function of the
seriousness of the concrete harm intended. The law does, and ought, look the
other way for higher risks if the harm intended is minor than if death is intended.
Thus the ratio aspect of the question for the observer should be phrased: "If the
conduct is repeated n times would it give rise to a concrete harm at least once?"
where n is set by the substantive criminal law for each primary offense.
Id. at 1100.
194. Williams, supra note 121, at 55.
195. Weigend, supra note 28, at 264.
196. Id. at 263-64.
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Weigend asserts that the interest in avoiding disturbances of the
public peace has survived as a rationale for criminal punishment and
constitutes the harm to the public caused by criminal attempts:
We have seen that an attempt usually does not do damage to any
tangible object. But that does not mean that an attempt is
harmless.... Every such act has the potential to violate an
intangible good-the public peace. The harm caused is the
apprehension and fear of the victim as well as the alarm of the
community about the fact that someone has set out to do serious
damage to a fellow citizen and to break the accepted rules of social
life.' 97
Professor Weigend's suggestion that the harm caused by attempt
is the spread of public alarm seems eminently sensible to me.
Attempts are failures by definition. What they fail to produce is the
harm of the completed crime. Therefore, the harm of attempt cannot
be the harm of the completed offense and the effort to derive it
therefrom must lead to metaphysical conundrums. On the other
hand, attempts clearly have their own harmful effects on citizens'
ability to lead peaceful and secure lives. Attempts to kill, injure, or
steal or destroy property are extremely likely to provoke violent
responses when the perpetrator is known, placing both the
antagonists and innocent members of the community at risk. And
when the perpetrators are not known or not apprehended, attempts
produce unease that causes citizens to either restrict their activities to
avoid harm or expend resources on protective measures. Attempted
muggings keep people off the streets and attempted burglaries boost
home security system sales as much as successful muggings and
burglaries. The need to protect the public against this type of harm
provides a perfectly coherent and adequate justification for the
criminalization of attempts.
If this is correct and the harm that justifies outlawing attempts is
their potential to spread public alarm, the nature of the objective
condition for the actus reus of attempt becomes plain. To be
punishable, an attempt must consist in conduct sufficient to arouse
public alarm. As Weigend himself expresses this, "the proposed test
can be formulated by the following sentence: An attempt which
cannot succeed is punishable if the offender's conduct, seen in the
light of his statements accompanying the acts he deemed necessary
197. Id. at 264 (footnotes omitted).
November 2002] ATTEMPTING THE IMPOSSIBLE
for achieving his purpose, would cause alarm or apprehension to an
average observer."'1 98
There is every reason to believe that the requirement that the
defendant's conduct be sufficient to cause public alarm is the proper
objective condition for attempt liability. In the first place, it properly
excludes from liability the cases of innocent-appearing and irrational
attempts that create an unjustifiable risk of enforcement error and
abuse. It eliminates liability for innocent-appearing attempts because
in order for conduct to cause public alarm, it must be overt. Only
conduct that would suggest criminal activity to an observer can cause
public alarm. Thus, like the previously discussed overtness
condition,'9 the public alarm requirement both preserves the common
law defense of legal impossibility and eliminates liability for cases of
innocent-appearing factual impossibility. It also eliminates liability
for irrational attempts because even though the conduct of one
engaged in an irrational attempt may suggest that he or she desires a
criminal end, such conduct "would not impress the average,
moderately enlightened observer as being a serious menace to his
feeling of safety."'"0 Thus, it would not be adequate to cause public
alarm.
Secondly, the requirement that the defendant's conduct cause
public alarm stands on a firm theoretical footing. Generally speaking,
restrictions on citizens' liberty need justification. In the context of the
criminal law, this justification takes the form of a showing that the
restriction is necessary to prevent harm to the public. Attempted
crimes cause harm to the public when they produce the type of public
alarm that can lead to violent retaliation or cause citizens to curtail
their activities or expend resources on self-protection. Therefore,
there is clear normative justification for punishing attempts that cause
public alarm and only attempts that cause public alarm.
Finally, the requirement that the defendant's conduct cause
public alarm is an entirely practicable one. It requires no dense
metaphysical discriminations or complex normative judgments to
apply it. The decision as to whether conduct is sufficient to cause
public alarm is clearly within the competence of the courts. A
judiciary that is competent to make decisions as to how a reasonable
person would act is competent to make judgments as to what would
alarm an average citizen.
198. Id. at 268-69.
199. See supra text accompanying note 186.
200. Weigend, supra note 28, at 270.
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Thus, the subjectivist challenge has now been met. The inherent
liberalism of the criminal law provides the reason of policy for
requiring an objective condition for liability for attempt and the
requirement that the defendant's conduct be sufficient to cause public
alarm provides a practicable distinction between punishable and non-
punishable impossible attempts. It appears that the decades-old
puzzle of when one can be punished for attempting the impossible has
a rather simple solution. One can be punished for an attempt that
cannot possibly succeed when, with the specific intent to commit an
offense known to the law, one engages in conduct sufficient to cause
public alarm if observed by an average citizen.
Conclusion
In this article, I have argued that the common law defense of
impossibility on a charge of attempt is both intelligible and
normatively grounded. Far from the morass of confusion its critics
make it out to be, the defense is actually quite easy to apply when
correctly understood. Furthermore, it preserves an important
protection against enforcement error and abuse by state officials that
is mandated by a correct understanding of the nature of criminal
responsibility and the inherent liberalism of the criminal law. As a
result, its abandonment in most jurisdictions in the United States has
been an unfortunate occurrence.
I have also argued that although the common law impossibility
defense is normatively justified as far as it goes, it does not go far
enough. By allowing conviction in all cases of factual impossibility,
the defense permits the prosecution of innocent-appearing and
irrational factually impossible attempts that present the same
unjustified risk of enforcement error and abuse as the cases of legal
impossibility covered by the defense. Because the requirement that
criminal prohibitions be designed to prevent harm to the public is the
mechanism by which the inherent liberalism of the criminal law is
given effect, I then argued that punishable attempts can be separated
from non-punishable attempts on the basis of whether they produce
the harm the prohibition on attempt is designed to prevent. Because
this harm is the spread of public alarm, attempts, whether impossible
or not, should be punished when and only when the defendant, acting
with the specific intent to commit an offense known to the law,
engages in conduct sufficient to cause public alarm if observed by an
average citizen.
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This definition of attempt appears to resolve the classic
conundrums associated with the prosecution of impossible attempts
that are reflected by the sagas of our fictional friends. Jean-Claude
and people like him have long been a thorn in the side of attempt
theorists. Frequently more pitiable than truly dangerous, our
intuitions suggest that they are poor candidates for criminal
punishment, something that is even implicitly recognized by the
Model Penal Code." ' Yet under both the common law classifications
and the Model Penal Code's definition, Jean-Claude was subject to
punishment for attempted murder. The proposed definition brings
the law of attempt into line with our normative intuitions by
exempting Jean-Claude from liability. Jean-Claude may have acted
with malice, but he did not act in a way that would cause the public
alarm that the prohibition on attempt is designed to prevent.
Therefore, Jean-Claude should not be subject to punishment.
Consider next the case of Laura and Frank. Both intended to
violate the law and both engaged in the identical innocent-appearing
action in an effort to realize their end. As a result, our intuitions
strongly suggest that they should be treated identically by the law.
Yet under the Model Penal Code's definition of attempt, Laura, who
made a mistake of law, remains free to continue her anti-
environmental activity, while Frank, who made a mistake of fact, ends
up in jail. This anomalous result occurs because under the Code's
definition, one's liability for punishment is determined by the type of
mistake one makes. Under the proposed definition, however, Laura
and Frank are treated identically by the law, as we feel is appropriate.
Both remain free to continue their agitation. Because the conduct of
both is innocent to outward appearance, neither's conduct can cause
public alarm. Thus, because neither threaten the harm the
prohibition on attempt is designed to prevent, neither is subject to
punishment.
Jenny's case, which is the classic example of the common law
defense of legal impossibility, has always been the focus of
subjectivist discontent. Why, they demanded, should one be allowed
to escape punishment who is every bit as blameworthy as those who
are subject to the criminal sanction? The proposed definition
supplies a clear and principled answer to this demand. Jenny should
201. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01, cmt. 3 at 316 (1985) (referring to section 5.05(2)
that permits the dismissal of charges against those whose "conduct charged to constitute
an attempt is 'so inherently unlikely to result or culminate in the commission of a crime
that neither such conduct nor the actor presents... a serious threat to the public"').
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escape punishment when others who are equally blameworthy do not
because her actions, which appear to be innocent, cannot cause the
public alarm that constitutes the harm the prohibition on attempt is
designed to prevent. The effort to subject her to criminal punishment
merely because she is morally blameworthy requires investing state
enforcement agents with more power to interfere with the liberty of
innocent citizens than can be justified by the minuscule gain in
security that would be achieved.
Finally, there is Clarissa's case. Under both the common law and
the Model Penal Code, Clarissa would be liable for attempted
murder. There can be no gainsaying that Clarissa is a dangerous
individual who, because her actions are not overt and hence cannot
cause public alarm, would not be subject to punishment under the
proposed definition. However, she is also the type of individual that
it is most dangerous to attempt to subject to criminal sanction
because "apart from [her] confession, there is nothing at all that
approaches the threshold of criminal behavior."2 2 Authorizing the
prosecution of people like Clarissa authorizes the prosecution of
defendants "where proof of the intention of the accused is the only
circumstance that could make us begin to think of what has been
done as a criminal attempt,"203 something that certainly provides state
enforcement agents with too much power to interfere with the liberty
of citizens. By exempting Clarissa from liability for attempt, the
proposed definition protects all of us against the danger of
overreaching by the state.
It may appear rather late in the day to suggest that we reverse
the trend away from the impossibility defense. But perhaps all is not
lost. In this Article, I have not suggested that we return to the
common law defense, but that we recognize an expanded and
theoretically grounded version of it that requires conduct capable of
causing public alarm for attempt liability. By not referring to this as
an impossibility defense, the proposed definition of attempt should be
able to avoid the negative reputation associated with the common law
defense. I therefore respectfully submit that the state legislatures
consider revising their criminal codes to incorporate the public alarm
definition of attempt in preference to the open-ended Model Penal
Code definition.
202. Hughes, supra note 4, at 1024.
203. Id.
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